(May 7, 2021 at 2:31 pm)Angrboda Wrote: It wasn't intended to argue that case. What it was intended to do was provide an inductive argument against believing in arguments for objective morals that are predicated upon subjective assessments as opposed to facts and logic which can be examined. You haven't offered any reason for believing that you possess a rational and objective foundation for ethics.
So, I've posted this before when the topic of moral naturalism has come up. IDK if it's relevant to the discourse here. Sorry if you guys are talking about something else.
Quote:(1) A property P is genuine if it figures ineliminably in a good explanation of observed
phenomena.
(2) Moral properties figure ineliminably in good explanations of observed phenomena.
Therefore
(3) Moral properties are genuine.
Quote:The ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations is one perennially attractive argument in favour of the metaphysical claims of realism. The initially attractive thought is that moral properties earn their ontological rights in the same way as the metaphysically unproblematic properties of the natural and social sciences, namely by figuring in good explanatory theories. So just as, for example, a physicist may explain why an oil droplet stays suspended in an electro-magnetic field by citing its charge, or a social scientist may explain high levels of mental illness by citing income inequality, a ‘moral scientist’ may explain the growth of political protest movements or social instability by citing injustice. Likewise, just as an observer of the physicist may explain why he believes that the oil droplet is charged by citing the charge itself, and an observer of the sociologist may explain why she believes that income inequality exists by citing the inequality itself, an observer of the ‘moral scientist’ may explain why they believe that a situation is unjust by citing the injustice itself. In such cases, it appears that the instantiation of a moral property – injustice – is causally relevant in producing an effect – a political protest movement or moral judgement.http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1930/1/T...prints.pdf
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As for intuitionism, as far as I understand, it is not a problem for moral naturalism. It IS a big problem for metaphysical theories (which I tend to prefer over naturalism). G.E. Moore's moral system seems to need to rely fundamentally on intuitions of what is "good." And that is very dissatisfying.
Again, sorry if I'm misunderstanding the argument... but what I've found in my search for a foundation of ethics is that ALL metaethical positions are problematic. If you're a committed skeptic, moral nihilism is where you end up. But the nihilistic position is also very problematic. Just like the realist's argument.
I think that's why most people are tempted to accept relativism, but as I've always said, relativism is an incoherent position. It's untenable. Period. I recently discovered a YouTube video where the lecturer said the very same thing. I really felt vindicated when I listened to it. I'll try to dig it up and include it.
But anyway, though I have settled on realism... to me, moral nihilism is a tenable position. And a nihilist isn't necessarily an evil jerk. A moral nihilist could spend his whole life creating a fair and just society. It's just when you ask him why, his reply will be "Because I want to." or "I prefer justice over injustice," NOT "Because it's the right thing to do."
