[Serious] Moral Obligations toward Possible Worlds

[vulcanlogician]

There's plenty of debate as to whether mathematical objects are real or not.  When you say that mathematics can't survive this sort of skepticism, you are implying that math does or should survive such skepticism when the reality is that there is considerable disagreement as to whether it does.

I do not assume math survives (or should survive) that kind of skepticism. A good case can be made for mathematical fictionalism. But a good case can be made against it too. But (we must admit) you really have to dial up the skepticism to consider mathematical fictionalism. And if someone wants to do that-- fine. But many of my interlocutors are hesitant to use that level of skepticism with math. But they throw that much plus the kitchen sink at morality.

And that's fine. Moral realism has trouble surviving the kitchen sink test... and that's an issue. But so does math. That's all I'm saying.

You're confusing bad in the moral sense with non-moral senses of bad.

I'm not confusing them, I'm putting them in the same category. Think about Epicurus' project. He wanted to discover "the good life." And he wound up at the conclusion that pleasure is good (ie worth seeking in one's own life, and that's the point he argued). Now. If you buy that, then when you ask the question "How can I do good for others?"-- you have an answer.

What is good? and What is bad? and to the discussion of this question (of these questions) I give the name of Ethics, since that science must, at all events, include it.
...
But this is a question which may have many meanings. If, for example, each of us were to say ‘I am doing good now’ or ‘I had a good dinner yesterday,’ these statements would each of them be some sort of answer to our question, although perhaps a false one. So, too, when A asks B what school he ought to send his son to, B’s answer will certainly be an ethical judgment. And similarly all distribution of praise or blame to any personage or thing that has existed, now exists, or will exist, does give some answer to the question ‘What is good?’ In all such cases some particular thing is judged to be good or bad: the question ‘What?’ is answered by ‘This.’ But this is not the sense in which a scientific Ethics asks the question.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/53430/53...3430-h.htm

If I go in for surgery, and I experience pain during the surgery, that doesn't mean the surgeon harmed me in any way that is morally relevant.

Assuming you get relief from the surgery, that pain is an "instrumental good" that is ultimately designed to reduce pain. So it is a morally relevant affair. You could say that it is "good" that you had the surgery because the happiness/relief from pain the operation afforded you outweighs whatever pain might be involved in the procedure.

What if you had power of attorney of a woman with severe alzheimer's? And let's say she is diagnosed with the same thing you had the surgery for. And you know that the surgery worked well to give you relief. Would it be right to let her suffer, even though you have it in your power to use her copious bank funds to pay her medical expenses?

That's a straight up moral question, wouldn't you agree? And it starts with the recognition that pain/suffering is bad.

And don't worry I won't tell anyone about the "pillow incident"

But, yeah. Consequentialist theories struggle to show the importance of intention. It's a real weakness in those theories IMO.