Any Moral Relativists in the House?
May 23, 2021 at 2:26 am
(This post was last modified: May 23, 2021 at 2:44 am by vulcanlogician.)
When I was a newly-minted atheist, moral relativism seemed like it made a great deal of sense. So I kind of held it as an assumption through my teens and most of my twenties. And, to be fair, moral relativism has some strengths.
For one, relativism is a good assumptive model for sociologists and anthropologists to use when analyzing the mores and customs of a given population. My view is that most people act morally due to social pressures; enforced by law sometimes, but most of the time maintained by soft coercive social forces... friends, family, and whatever clique you may roll with. Perceiving the world through that model, customs become indistinguishable from moral practices. So (in that way) moral relativism is a clear lens through which one may interpret social activities.
As an assumptive model, it's great. But, I'd like to argue that, as a moral theory, it sucks. It's incoherent. If anyone wants to challenge me on that, I'd love to discuss the matter in detail.
Mind you, I'm not saying: "moral realism is the obvious answer." It isn't obvious. There are good criticisms that can be leveled at realism. It's a shaky position (as all metaethical positions are). That's why relativism seems so appealing. It seems less shaky. But there is a problem with cultural relativism that transcends mere shakiness.
"Cultural relativism claims that correct moral standards are relative to cultures or societies." That's one person's definition anyway (Russ Shafer-Landau). We can look at different definitions if you wish. But I think this one says what cultural relativism is pretty well. To me, that doesn't make sense. It's an incoherent position because it says cultural conditions (which are ever-changing and develop the way they do for a myriad of reasons) has some bearing on what moral standards actually are.
If you want to reject moral realism, fine. But the statements or states of societies have no bearing on what "correct" moral standards are. That makes no sense.
Better to say, "No moral statement can be true." Or: Just like a person rejects a belief in a god, so too, one says, "All this morality stuff is make believe." Error theory. THIS is a coherent position. And objectively better than relativism, epistemologically speaking. It stands on firm ground. Every nihilistic position is better than relativism.
What about emotivism? "Moral beliefs aren't statements of fact. They are basic reactions to things."
When we taste a sour lemon, we pucker up. When we taste something bitter, we say "yuck." Likewise we have physiological and psychological responses to things like murder and theft. "Murder... yuck!" ... "Theft... bleh."
Those are two coherent anti-realist positions. The first: "All this morality stuff is make believe." The second: "Most people simply think murder is contemptible. There are no facts involved. It's just how people feel." There are others too, and each one is better than relativism.
As the nihilist sees things, all this talk of moral facts is rubbish. True or not true, nihilism is a coherent position. What's not coherent is to say that "we can speak of what is morally correct, but it has to relate to some cultural norm or social construct. And can only be correct in relation to that." THAT is more rubbish than any supposed moral fact could ever be. Either deny morality has any real existence outright, or say that moral facts are possible. The notion that they are contingent just doesn't gel.
For any who are interested, here is a really fun article written by an unapologetic moral nihilist. It shows what the nihilistic position really is. He gives some interesting defenses of moral nihilism. Though apologetics aren't the main point of the article. The main point of the article is that, it might be wise to maintain morality as a useful fiction. Not only at a societal level, but (even if you're a moral nihilist) in your own individual life.
Moral Fictionalism
I don't want to argue a specific meta ethical position here. I want to talk about the status of moral relativism amidst competing theories. I want to say realism and nihilism are coherent positions. But relativism (whether individual or cultural) is not. At least that's what I think. I'd love to be persuaded otherwise, because that'd mean I learned something significant. Any moral relativists in the house?
For one, relativism is a good assumptive model for sociologists and anthropologists to use when analyzing the mores and customs of a given population. My view is that most people act morally due to social pressures; enforced by law sometimes, but most of the time maintained by soft coercive social forces... friends, family, and whatever clique you may roll with. Perceiving the world through that model, customs become indistinguishable from moral practices. So (in that way) moral relativism is a clear lens through which one may interpret social activities.
As an assumptive model, it's great. But, I'd like to argue that, as a moral theory, it sucks. It's incoherent. If anyone wants to challenge me on that, I'd love to discuss the matter in detail.
Mind you, I'm not saying: "moral realism is the obvious answer." It isn't obvious. There are good criticisms that can be leveled at realism. It's a shaky position (as all metaethical positions are). That's why relativism seems so appealing. It seems less shaky. But there is a problem with cultural relativism that transcends mere shakiness.
"Cultural relativism claims that correct moral standards are relative to cultures or societies." That's one person's definition anyway (Russ Shafer-Landau). We can look at different definitions if you wish. But I think this one says what cultural relativism is pretty well. To me, that doesn't make sense. It's an incoherent position because it says cultural conditions (which are ever-changing and develop the way they do for a myriad of reasons) has some bearing on what moral standards actually are.
If you want to reject moral realism, fine. But the statements or states of societies have no bearing on what "correct" moral standards are. That makes no sense.
Better to say, "No moral statement can be true." Or: Just like a person rejects a belief in a god, so too, one says, "All this morality stuff is make believe." Error theory. THIS is a coherent position. And objectively better than relativism, epistemologically speaking. It stands on firm ground. Every nihilistic position is better than relativism.
What about emotivism? "Moral beliefs aren't statements of fact. They are basic reactions to things."
When we taste a sour lemon, we pucker up. When we taste something bitter, we say "yuck." Likewise we have physiological and psychological responses to things like murder and theft. "Murder... yuck!" ... "Theft... bleh."
Those are two coherent anti-realist positions. The first: "All this morality stuff is make believe." The second: "Most people simply think murder is contemptible. There are no facts involved. It's just how people feel." There are others too, and each one is better than relativism.
As the nihilist sees things, all this talk of moral facts is rubbish. True or not true, nihilism is a coherent position. What's not coherent is to say that "we can speak of what is morally correct, but it has to relate to some cultural norm or social construct. And can only be correct in relation to that." THAT is more rubbish than any supposed moral fact could ever be. Either deny morality has any real existence outright, or say that moral facts are possible. The notion that they are contingent just doesn't gel.
For any who are interested, here is a really fun article written by an unapologetic moral nihilist. It shows what the nihilistic position really is. He gives some interesting defenses of moral nihilism. Though apologetics aren't the main point of the article. The main point of the article is that, it might be wise to maintain morality as a useful fiction. Not only at a societal level, but (even if you're a moral nihilist) in your own individual life.
Moral Fictionalism
I don't want to argue a specific meta ethical position here. I want to talk about the status of moral relativism amidst competing theories. I want to say realism and nihilism are coherent positions. But relativism (whether individual or cultural) is not. At least that's what I think. I'd love to be persuaded otherwise, because that'd mean I learned something significant. Any moral relativists in the house?
