(October 7, 2021 at 2:01 pm)Angrboda Wrote: I feel the emotional entanglement is a bit quixotic. If moral propositions didn't have an emotional component, then they wouldn't be felt as imperatives compelling us to act or not act depending upon its valence. A proposition about homicide is just a neutral abstraction without some emotional sense of should or shouldn't attached to it. So, on the one hand, the entanglement with emotion presents epistemological difficulties, yet without the entanglement with emotion the intuition is no longer moral.
Does this mean that morality necessarily entails epistemological issues? Maybe.
This is the line of criticism I pursued in my private thinking. Stich wants to present our moral intuitions as a cluster of "kluges" (a bunch of sociallity-related internal processes that were kind of crammed together by evolution to generate our moral sense). In a way, he is right about that. But as one of the attendees responded after the lecture: "The eye is a kluge."
Almost every product of evolution is a kluge of some sort. The eye allows us to perceive the world more or less accurately. Maybe not perfectly, but we can compensate for the eye's imperfections. I want to say we can do the same with our moral intuitions.
@DLJ
Working on a response. Gimmie some time.
