RE: Nuclear war survival guide.
March 3, 2022 at 2:33 am
(This post was last modified: March 3, 2022 at 4:32 am by Anomalocaris.)
It is designed to sail as close in shore as possible before detonating, preferably into a harbor near a coastal city. So it will produce as much fallout from the sea floor as 50mt salted bomb as possible , which will then be entrained in the water plume it throws up. It would not make sense to detonate it in deep water.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world...atus-6.htm
It’s capability is obviously not gear to fighting and winning a limited nuclear war that focuses on destruction of the enemy’s military capability and political leadership, and inflict civilian damage only as collateral casualty.
It is likely intended to be triggered by a deadman switch system should Russia be destroyed or severely incapacitated in a nuclear war. Being small, relatively slow, quiet, nuclear powered, and thus able to take circuitous routes to reach targets from unpredicatble direction and unpredictable times, it would be very difficult to detect and stop. It will arrive weeks or months after the first nuclear exchange, but that does not nullify its purpose so long as Russia’s enemy knows Russia had it and it works before any perspective nuclear war.
It’s objective is to let the enemy know that no type of success in nuclear war with Russia could stop these revenge weapons nor prevent large tracts of the victor’s coastal territory from being rendered uninhabitable for decades, thus altering any fundamental balance sheet analysis of whether to pursue the nuclear option in the first place.
Russia, or rather the Soviet Union, had previously deployed other deadman switch systems for similar purpose of letting Russia’s enemy know no first strike is likely to succeed. The system was called perimeter. It’s deadman switch was a number of special ICBMs connected to a network of sensors which can detect, classify and locate nearby as well as distant nuclear explosions in soviet territory. If a prescribed number and location of nuclear detonations are detected, a successful surprise nuclear attack on the USSR is automatically assumed, because in any other scenario where hostile nuclear weapon detonate on or over the USSR, Soviet missile should have been lashed already.
Once the detonations are detected, The special ICBMs are then automatically launched. The special ICBM differs from normal ICBM in that each carried a special command communication package that sends e launch instruction to all remaining Soviet strategic missiles and other nuclear platforms such as missile submarines and bombers, after the command missile reach prescribed altitude, and instruct them to automatically launch their weapons without inputs from their crews. The purpose of the system is also to let Russia’s enemy know that successfully decapitating Soviet military and civilian leadership will not stop all out revenge strike.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world...atus-6.htm
It’s capability is obviously not gear to fighting and winning a limited nuclear war that focuses on destruction of the enemy’s military capability and political leadership, and inflict civilian damage only as collateral casualty.
It is likely intended to be triggered by a deadman switch system should Russia be destroyed or severely incapacitated in a nuclear war. Being small, relatively slow, quiet, nuclear powered, and thus able to take circuitous routes to reach targets from unpredicatble direction and unpredictable times, it would be very difficult to detect and stop. It will arrive weeks or months after the first nuclear exchange, but that does not nullify its purpose so long as Russia’s enemy knows Russia had it and it works before any perspective nuclear war.
It’s objective is to let the enemy know that no type of success in nuclear war with Russia could stop these revenge weapons nor prevent large tracts of the victor’s coastal territory from being rendered uninhabitable for decades, thus altering any fundamental balance sheet analysis of whether to pursue the nuclear option in the first place.
Russia, or rather the Soviet Union, had previously deployed other deadman switch systems for similar purpose of letting Russia’s enemy know no first strike is likely to succeed. The system was called perimeter. It’s deadman switch was a number of special ICBMs connected to a network of sensors which can detect, classify and locate nearby as well as distant nuclear explosions in soviet territory. If a prescribed number and location of nuclear detonations are detected, a successful surprise nuclear attack on the USSR is automatically assumed, because in any other scenario where hostile nuclear weapon detonate on or over the USSR, Soviet missile should have been lashed already.
Once the detonations are detected, The special ICBMs are then automatically launched. The special ICBM differs from normal ICBM in that each carried a special command communication package that sends e launch instruction to all remaining Soviet strategic missiles and other nuclear platforms such as missile submarines and bombers, after the command missile reach prescribed altitude, and instruct them to automatically launch their weapons without inputs from their crews. The purpose of the system is also to let Russia’s enemy know that successfully decapitating Soviet military and civilian leadership will not stop all out revenge strike.
