(July 22, 2022 at 12:21 pm)Mister Agenda Wrote:(July 21, 2022 at 1:40 pm)Klorophyll Wrote: The statement " can only do what it always knew it was going to do" is not problematic, and doesn't entail a contradiction with omnipotence, because God doesn't change His intention (because he's omniscient, we only change our mind when we are presented with new information/see the information from a new perspective, but God always has full information and knows all possible perspectives, so he never needs to change his decisions).
I can see why you consider that a good counter, but a fully omniscient being can't even change its mind about which finger to wiggle, that is, it can't even change its mind just to see if it can change its mind. It can't, not even for the most trivial of actions for which information makes no difference. It may not need to change its decisions, but it also can't change its decisions.
Not sure if this is relevant given just a glance, but it may be:
Quote:Two types of incompatibilism
Plantinga's defense presupposes incompatibilism. Incompatibilists, however, disagree over what we might call the Principle of Alternate Possibilities:
PAP. S is free with respect to A only if S has it within his power to do otherwise.
Of course, compatibilists like to understand the power to do otherwise in such a way that one has it even though there is no possible world in which one does other than what one did, given the distant past and the laws of nature. Incompatibilists, however, tend to deny this. As one prominent incompatibility likes to put the point: if someone is free with respect to an action when deciding whether to do it, they are "in a situation strongly analogous to that of someone who is hesitating between forks in a road."
Quote:To say that one has free will is to say that when one decides among forks in the road of time (or, more prosaically, when one decides what to do), one is at least sometimes able to take more than one of the forks has free will if sometimes more than one of are "open" to one. One lacks free will if on must make a decision only one of the fork be the fork one in fact takes - is open to one.
On this picture of freedom, the power to do "forks" in the road of time, not merely that there seem to be such "forks".
Some incompatibilists reject PAP and the picture of a forking road that comes with it. They replace it with something like the Principle of Ultimate Causes:
PUC. S is free with respect to A only if the ultimate cause of A is S's own will and cognitive faculties.
Incompatibilists who replace PAP with PUC say that it is possible for one to act freely even if there are no alternatives "open" to one. But, they say, it does not follow that it is possible for one to act freely if one's action is determined by the distant past and the laws of nature since, in that case, the ultimate cause of one's action is not one's own will and cognitive faculties. Thus, they say, their view remains resolutely incompatibility.
“Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defense.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 44, no. 1, 1998, pp. 1–21