To address further the comparison of clinical depression, as a self-reported condition, with gender identity:
Depression cannot be quantified independently of a sufferer's self-reports. There is no chemical test for it -- this is certainly true. In a broad sense, however, there are cases when someone's self-report can be rejected by an experienced professional.
If a new patient met a psychiatrist, and said that he wasn't enjoying ballroom dancing five nights a week quite as much as he used to, and anyway he felt slightly sad after the orgy on Friday, and he claimed that this makes him clinically depressed and in need of strong medication, the doctor would be justified in doubting the self-diagnosis. We all have ups and downs and not all of the downs count as clinical depression, even if it seems that way to the person doing the reporting.
So there are cases in which a patient could say, "Doc, I have clinical depression," and the doctor could justifiably say, "No, you don't."
And this is a key point in scientific claims, I think: falsifiability. If a doctor can point to reasons why a patient's condition does not qualify as clinical depression, then the claim is potentially falsified. It is not as objective or as quantifiable as some other medical issues, but it is something that a professional could rule out, given certain conditions.
For claims about gender identity to reach the same standard of objectivity, there would need to be some standards by which a patient could be shown to be mistaken. The claim could be falsified. This is why a potential objective test -- chemical or whatever -- would also introduce the possibility of showing that the person making the claim is mistaken. "My true identity is female." "No it isn't." Would become a possible objective empirical conclusion.
So if we feel that we should accept unprovable, unfalsifiable claims as true, this is a choice based on our beliefs about how we want our society to work (i.e. ideology) not on science. I am not arguing that it is a bad choice. But I want to be clear that we have beliefs which are not empirical, objective, or scientific. We believe some truth-claims because it is how we think the world ought to be.
Depression cannot be quantified independently of a sufferer's self-reports. There is no chemical test for it -- this is certainly true. In a broad sense, however, there are cases when someone's self-report can be rejected by an experienced professional.
If a new patient met a psychiatrist, and said that he wasn't enjoying ballroom dancing five nights a week quite as much as he used to, and anyway he felt slightly sad after the orgy on Friday, and he claimed that this makes him clinically depressed and in need of strong medication, the doctor would be justified in doubting the self-diagnosis. We all have ups and downs and not all of the downs count as clinical depression, even if it seems that way to the person doing the reporting.
So there are cases in which a patient could say, "Doc, I have clinical depression," and the doctor could justifiably say, "No, you don't."
And this is a key point in scientific claims, I think: falsifiability. If a doctor can point to reasons why a patient's condition does not qualify as clinical depression, then the claim is potentially falsified. It is not as objective or as quantifiable as some other medical issues, but it is something that a professional could rule out, given certain conditions.
For claims about gender identity to reach the same standard of objectivity, there would need to be some standards by which a patient could be shown to be mistaken. The claim could be falsified. This is why a potential objective test -- chemical or whatever -- would also introduce the possibility of showing that the person making the claim is mistaken. "My true identity is female." "No it isn't." Would become a possible objective empirical conclusion.
So if we feel that we should accept unprovable, unfalsifiable claims as true, this is a choice based on our beliefs about how we want our society to work (i.e. ideology) not on science. I am not arguing that it is a bad choice. But I want to be clear that we have beliefs which are not empirical, objective, or scientific. We believe some truth-claims because it is how we think the world ought to be.
