“Normative” ethical theories

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah, fair! Stupidly phrased of me re wanting to work out what ethical systems deal with how to live / structure society. I meant it specifically in the light of anti-realist commitments. If any are structured around a view that there is an objective type of right or wrong, virtue / vice and that is the underpinning of all else that follows, then it isn’t really one I am as interested in. If I can jettison those underpinnings without damaging the practical part of the system, or the basis for which I should consider the system worth following then I would love to read up on them.
I guess utilitarian views might be worth me looking at. 

I am working through Morris’ less recent book “Science and the end of ethics” and he answers my questions in part there. He looks at desire dependent and desire independent enlightened self-interest views. Not enough there for me to really get my teeth into, but it gives at least a view of “here is a good way to approach life and culture that is grounded on non-realist commitments.” Basically being the view that acting in prosocial ways can benefit oneself and that this is worth striving for as a society as it would make people happier in themselves, but also others as well. 

I don’t feel comfortable with the view that we ought to normalise bad treatment of prisoners for the purpose of making prisons easier to run. The studies that Morris and others cite point out that prison systems where this is the case tend to lead to more recidivism and therefore cost society more overall. It might be better for the person running the prison, on the budget they have, but to my mind that is an issue of needing to invest more into the system and not treat prisoners as if they are somehow deserving of such treatment. 

That isn’t just something I am saying about the US system, but the studies I see cited in what I have read focus on that system in comparison to those in some of the Scandinavian countries. Heck, Britain isn’t great in this respect either with chronic understaffing, poor living conditions, lack of focus on reintegrating people successfully back into society.
Of course, my desire for the things above to change isn’t grounded in some metaethical truth claims about what should be. But it is nonetheless something I would like to see changed (and too lazy to do anything about it myself).

I suggested quasi realist utilitarian emotivism precisely because you say things like the bolded bits.  It's linguistic or semantic, not metaethical. It acknowledges that nothing you've said is morally or ethically truth-making, but that we find such utterances more compelling and thus more useful to change..which we seek because yum or yuck, not for any purported benefit (even if such benefits do or might exist).

There exist such a thing as facts from studies which are truth-making in ethical consideration?  Recidivism is bad? Cost overruns are bad? Prisons running do or at least should do a particular thing that isn't related to the financial earnings of the operator?  You believe it to be inconceivable that some society may in fact benefit from prisons organized this way?  There's such a thing as a need for society to invest more, or...do anything at all?  There's a way we shouldn't treat prisoners?  There should be more staff?  There's such a thing as a better living conditions, and such a thing as desert?  

These aren't claims about how you feel - though they very well could be grounded in them, properly.  They reject equivalent and countervailing subjectivist and relativist claims.  Is what you're looking for a way to say realist things without acknowledging realist content, or ethical systems truly devoid of any realist content or conceit? For the former...that's easy, you don't need a system. Just lie, lie and lie some more until you get the change you desire. Whatever you think the other person would respond to...say that. For the latter.....what's the point? Normativity is in the business of right and wrong, rightly or wrongly.