RE: 4 random arguements for atheism.
July 27, 2009 at 12:56 am
(This post was last modified: July 27, 2009 at 1:10 am by Ryft.)
FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR ATHEISM (Non-Existence of God)
1. Failure of Revelation
Dotard argues first that divine revelation "is the basis for a myriad of competing scriptures, all of which contain inherently contradictory material. Hence, it is clear that most revelation—if not all revelation—from God or gods must be false" (emphasis added). If this is an argument for atheism, as he claims, it seems to be a modus tollens argument: (i) If God exists, some religious texts would contain no inherently contradictory material. (ii) All religious texts contain inherently contradictory material. (iii) Therefore, God does not exist.
(i) If P, then Q.
(ii) ¬Q.
(iii) Therefore, ¬P.
The problem with such an argument is that ¬Q carries no weight, because it does not follow that P necessarily implies Q in the first place. The strength of the second premise is robbed by a weakness of the first premise. The fact is, there is no logical contradiction between the propositions "All religious texts are false" and "God exists" (i.e., it is logically possible for every religious text in the world to be false and yet God nevertheless exists). Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism. Second, if "all" religious texts contain inherently contradictory material, it does not follow that only "most" of them are false. Logic dictates that if all, then all. Third, since it is not prima facie evident that "all [religious texts] contain inherently contradictory material," the premise shoulders an extraordinary burden of proof (for the substantive importance, logical relevance, and controversial nature of the premise does not allow us to simply assume its truth). But this is moot in the face that P does not necessarily imply Q anyway.
He argues second that "if any revelation had been from a true god or gods, one might reasonably expect parallel versions of the religion to arise in different locations independently of each other." First, this argument holds only if we have reason to believe that God revealed himself to multiple peoples. If most (or all) religious texts are false, then we do not have reason to believe such. Dotard's first argument undercuts this argument. Second, there is no logical contradiction between the propositions "There are no geopolitically parallel versions of religion" and "God exists" (i.e., it is logically possible that one text is the product of an existent God revealing himself and all other texts are human fabrications). Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism.
He argues third that the diverse pattern and spread of so-called revelation suggests that "religious revelation always arises from the imagination of individuals." First, this argument holds only if all religious texts are false (which shoulders an extraordinary burden of proof), for, as previously indicated, it is logically possible for one of those religious texts to be the product of an existent God revealing himself, while all others texts are human fabrications. Second, again as previously indicated, there is no contradiction between the propositions "All religious texts are false" and "God exists" (i.e., it is logically possible for every religious text in the world to be the product of human imagination and yet God nevertheless exists). Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism.
He argues finally that "the main reason that people come to believe in gods is not revelation, but tradition." However, even if it were true that every single circumstance of God-belief was the product of tradition, it does not follow that God does not exist. Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism.
2. God as a Bad Explanation
Dotard argues that as gaps in our knowledge about the natural world close, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to affirm supernatural explanations. However, even if the scientific community produced natural explanations for absolutely every empirical phenomena, effectively undercutting God-of-the-gaps arguments, it does not follow that God does not exist. Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism. Furthermore, his argument is further weakened by the fact that God is not merely a placeholder for unexplained empirical phenomena. If that was the only thing the existence of God explained, his argument might carry some kind of weight.
3. Divine Silence
It is difficult to determine how Dotard proposes 'divine silence' as an argument for atheism. Perhaps he is again making a modus tollens argument: (i) If God exists, he would enable everyone to believe in him. (ii) God has not enabled everyone to believe in him. (iii) Therefore, God does not exist.
(i) If P, then Q.
(ii) ¬Q.
(iii) Therefore, ¬P.
There exists again the problem of ¬Q carrying no weight, for it does not follow that P necessarily implies Q in the first place. As indicated previously, the strength of the second premise is robbed by a weakness of the first premise. The fact is, there is no logical contradiction between the propositions "God has not enabled everyone to believe in him" and "God exists." In other words, it is logically possible that God exists and does not enable everyone to believe in him. Moreover, formidable arguments can be made by Deists on the one hand and Christians on the other that this is indeed the case. Also, weaknesses in the Free Will Defense count against the Free Will Defense, not against the existence of God. Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism.
Disembodied Brainless Thinkers
This argument fails in and of itself, as Dotard tries to use an argument for cause to reach a conclusion for identity. Specifically, an argument that brain states cause mental states does not somehow prove that mental states are identical to, the same thing as, brain states; q.v. ontological reduction (e.g., an argument that fire causes smoke does not somehow prove that smoke is the same thing as fire). Also, argument from personal incredulity is fallacious; it is a species of the ad ignorantiam fallacy. Just because a person finds a premise unlikely or unbelievable, it does not allow him to assume that the premise is false (e.g., Dotard finds it "extremely unlikely" that mental states could exist independent of brain states). Likewise, it does not follow from Dotard's inability to find any "reason why a thinking being should exist without a body to nurture and protect" that therefore a thinking being cannot exist without a body.
1. Failure of Revelation
Dotard argues first that divine revelation "is the basis for a myriad of competing scriptures, all of which contain inherently contradictory material. Hence, it is clear that most revelation—if not all revelation—from God or gods must be false" (emphasis added). If this is an argument for atheism, as he claims, it seems to be a modus tollens argument: (i) If God exists, some religious texts would contain no inherently contradictory material. (ii) All religious texts contain inherently contradictory material. (iii) Therefore, God does not exist.
(i) If P, then Q.
(ii) ¬Q.
(iii) Therefore, ¬P.
The problem with such an argument is that ¬Q carries no weight, because it does not follow that P necessarily implies Q in the first place. The strength of the second premise is robbed by a weakness of the first premise. The fact is, there is no logical contradiction between the propositions "All religious texts are false" and "God exists" (i.e., it is logically possible for every religious text in the world to be false and yet God nevertheless exists). Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism. Second, if "all" religious texts contain inherently contradictory material, it does not follow that only "most" of them are false. Logic dictates that if all, then all. Third, since it is not prima facie evident that "all [religious texts] contain inherently contradictory material," the premise shoulders an extraordinary burden of proof (for the substantive importance, logical relevance, and controversial nature of the premise does not allow us to simply assume its truth). But this is moot in the face that P does not necessarily imply Q anyway.
He argues second that "if any revelation had been from a true god or gods, one might reasonably expect parallel versions of the religion to arise in different locations independently of each other." First, this argument holds only if we have reason to believe that God revealed himself to multiple peoples. If most (or all) religious texts are false, then we do not have reason to believe such. Dotard's first argument undercuts this argument. Second, there is no logical contradiction between the propositions "There are no geopolitically parallel versions of religion" and "God exists" (i.e., it is logically possible that one text is the product of an existent God revealing himself and all other texts are human fabrications). Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism.
He argues third that the diverse pattern and spread of so-called revelation suggests that "religious revelation always arises from the imagination of individuals." First, this argument holds only if all religious texts are false (which shoulders an extraordinary burden of proof), for, as previously indicated, it is logically possible for one of those religious texts to be the product of an existent God revealing himself, while all others texts are human fabrications. Second, again as previously indicated, there is no contradiction between the propositions "All religious texts are false" and "God exists" (i.e., it is logically possible for every religious text in the world to be the product of human imagination and yet God nevertheless exists). Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism.
He argues finally that "the main reason that people come to believe in gods is not revelation, but tradition." However, even if it were true that every single circumstance of God-belief was the product of tradition, it does not follow that God does not exist. Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism.
2. God as a Bad Explanation
Dotard argues that as gaps in our knowledge about the natural world close, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to affirm supernatural explanations. However, even if the scientific community produced natural explanations for absolutely every empirical phenomena, effectively undercutting God-of-the-gaps arguments, it does not follow that God does not exist. Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism. Furthermore, his argument is further weakened by the fact that God is not merely a placeholder for unexplained empirical phenomena. If that was the only thing the existence of God explained, his argument might carry some kind of weight.
3. Divine Silence
It is difficult to determine how Dotard proposes 'divine silence' as an argument for atheism. Perhaps he is again making a modus tollens argument: (i) If God exists, he would enable everyone to believe in him. (ii) God has not enabled everyone to believe in him. (iii) Therefore, God does not exist.
(i) If P, then Q.
(ii) ¬Q.
(iii) Therefore, ¬P.
There exists again the problem of ¬Q carrying no weight, for it does not follow that P necessarily implies Q in the first place. As indicated previously, the strength of the second premise is robbed by a weakness of the first premise. The fact is, there is no logical contradiction between the propositions "God has not enabled everyone to believe in him" and "God exists." In other words, it is logically possible that God exists and does not enable everyone to believe in him. Moreover, formidable arguments can be made by Deists on the one hand and Christians on the other that this is indeed the case. Also, weaknesses in the Free Will Defense count against the Free Will Defense, not against the existence of God. Therefore, this fails as an argument for atheism.
Disembodied Brainless Thinkers
This argument fails in and of itself, as Dotard tries to use an argument for cause to reach a conclusion for identity. Specifically, an argument that brain states cause mental states does not somehow prove that mental states are identical to, the same thing as, brain states; q.v. ontological reduction (e.g., an argument that fire causes smoke does not somehow prove that smoke is the same thing as fire). Also, argument from personal incredulity is fallacious; it is a species of the ad ignorantiam fallacy. Just because a person finds a premise unlikely or unbelievable, it does not allow him to assume that the premise is false (e.g., Dotard finds it "extremely unlikely" that mental states could exist independent of brain states). Likewise, it does not follow from Dotard's inability to find any "reason why a thinking being should exist without a body to nurture and protect" that therefore a thinking being cannot exist without a body.
Man is a rational animal who always loses his temper when
called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.
(Oscar Wilde)
called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.
(Oscar Wilde)
