Do you believe in free will?

[genkaus]

I also consider that position to be non-sensical, that's why I consider free will to be non-sensical.

Thereby proving that the only meaning of "free-will" you are willing to accept is the supernatural interpretation.

I'm asking if anyone can demonstrate control over their selves, or differentiate themselves from that which is under control. In short, I'm asking for a demonstration of free will, not a redefinition of the words free or will. If we're redefining these things to be more in accordance with what can be demonstrated, do we not run the risk of redefining them so drastically that they no longer have any bearing on the original concept. IOW, if we drastically redefine free will, we're essentially removing free will from consideration and instead considering something else under an assumed name.

I disagree. I think that in light of modern knowledge, re-evaluation of the concept is in order.

The basic definition of free will remains the same. It is "the capacity of an agent to make a choice from alternatives free from certain constraints". This definition very much relies on the meaning of an agent and the constraints under consideration.

If the only definition of an agent you are willing to accept is a supernatural entity such as a soul or a spirit and the only constraint you consider is causality, then the term free-will does not make any sense. And in a context where an agent could only mean a soul or a spirit possessing a body and people believed in a supernatural realm free from causality - that was the only interpretation that made sense. The term was coined by theologians who believed in such things, but that is not the case here.

Given that we do not believe in existence of a supernatural soul or spirit, nor do we equate all constraints to causality, why should we continue using the interpretations of free-will that rely on those very definitions. If the term "agent" and "constraint" means something very different to us - so should the term "free-will". Otherwise, we are not being intellectually consistent.

So, if you are not free from causality, and your free will only requires that it be independent of external factors and dependent on you, then your free will would be dependent on causality, would it not?

Correct.

Again, how is this "free"?

Like you said - it is free from external factors and dependent on me.

How is this different, btw, from simply stating, "My free will is not dependent on causality (external, specifically, in your case), it is dependent on my free will (which is internal, but still not free from causality, as per your own remarks on the subject)"?

Its not. But I would state it as "My free will is not completely dependent on external causality, but it is dependent on me."

By the way, in your interpretation, is an agent's free-will required to be free of the agent as well?

Are we forming a non-cognitive statement?

I don't think so.

If your "free will" is an expression or effect of biochemistry, and if we can coerce or alter this expression by leveraging biochemistry (which we can) how free is your will?

My biochemistry is a part of me. By coercing or altering my biochemistry, you are coercing and altering me. Since my will is only as free as I am, it would be constrained to the extent I'm being coerced.

But my biochemistry is not all of me and to the extent that the other parts are not being coerced or altered, it would remain free from the said coercion or alteration.