Do you believe in free will?

[genkaus]

In fairness, that is EXACTLY why I defined the presuppositions before posing the question. It is not a loaded question because I defined the presuppositions and the logical (to me) conclusions.

The universe can only be changed in a limited number of ways.
1) Changing the current or past state of the universe in this instant we have paused.
2) Changing the fundamental laws of the universe that dictate how the universe progresses from one instant to another.

You ignored these statements in your answer. If these statements contain a logical or scientific fallacy, then the question is loaded. But I see no dismissal of this.

Read the argument again. These statements are not what cause your question to be loaded. Your explicitly given statements only refer to changing the current or past of the universe - which is determined. But in your argument, you talk about changing the future - which is not assumed to be determined.

Precisely. Free Will is an illusion, and a useful one, but no thing is free from causality(maybe quantum mechanics comes back into play again at this point since its known to often be observably an exception), no matter how complex the variations of causation are.

Here's your problem. Your argument is:
1. Free will means will that is free from causation.
2. Nothing is free from causation.
Therefore, free-will cannot exist.

My argument is:
1. Free will means will that is free from certain constraints (not necessarily causation).
2. Nothing is free from causation.
Therefore, free-will may very well exist.

You see the problem?

To prove free will, you must show how the universe changes from one state to another through our will. However, I am happy to accept "I Don't Know" as an answer, I'm not a theist after all

Me writing this post is an example. The universe external to me is not causally sufficient for this. Writing these statements is a result of my will and it is changing the state of the universe (from one where this post does not exist to one where it does).

So the formation of the ego actually separates us from causal chains?
While I don't dismiss your argument, since we are both bordering on the unfalsifiable, I see no reason to believe this is a possibility.

NO.

Formation of ego does not separate your from causal chain. It creates "you" as a separate entity within the causal chain - separate from the rest of the chain.

In order to do so, the ego much be an agent of change, to amend your will, between two separate states of existence. I.e. the ego must be able to decide between alternatives outside of the control, thou influenced by, biological causations.

By being an agent of change, the ego would automatically be a part of causal chain. It seems that your understanding of free-will asks for a contradiction - for ego to be separate from the causal chain and still remain a part of it.

The second part of your statement assumes ego to be independent and separate from one's biology. Again, that is not something I accept.

It just does is unsatisfying obviously, so we have choice A and choice B. If there is a chain of reasoning which leads to preferenace A, then it is clearly determined. In order for free will in this instance to exist, it must be made in each 'instant' rather than recourse to any previous 'instant' of the universe.

Again, this applies only when free-will is equated to will free from all causation. If free will is required only to be free from external causation, then there is not dichotomy between free-will and determinism.

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This I think is a fundamental error. Neither determinists nor free will theorists are proposing that determinism is in error. Both accept determinism fully. Where free will comes in is assuming that decisions and choices are determined by a law or laws that are not in the currently accepted set of natural laws. A free will is every bit a part of determinism, it's just that these specific choices are determined by something whose behavior and laws, for lack of a better term, are "free" — meaning certain departures from the other natural laws, whose behaviors seem not to possess this trait. The problem for the free will theorist is not to refute determinism — determinism is necessary for both — the problem is to demonstrate the existence of these heretofore unknown laws, and the entities which are ruled by them. (Pineal gland?)

The bolded part does seem to be the most commonly accepted meaning of free-will, even though there is nothing in its actual definition to suggest that. That is the misconception I'm trying to correct.

If something is not determined, either by current natural laws, or whatever additions are required to understand our will as free, then its behavior is essentially random, as nothing, free or not, determines its course. And this, as noted, is not free will. (As Rhythm hinted and I agree, compatibilism, the notion that determinism as defined by current natural laws does not preclude free will, usually by changing the definition of free will, is attempting to solve the problem by defining away the hard bits. But the hard bits are the part we find interesting. If a used car salesman offered you a tired old but truly free will, or a shiny new compatibilist free will, most of us would opt for real free will.)

If the current understanding of free-will (as being free from natural law), is based on a misconception (that the agent can exist independently of the natural law), then, in light of modern knowledge, it bears correction. Correcting one's understanding of what something means is not redefinition.

Just as we would not consider a human being to essentially be a "soul" or a "spirit" or something equally supernatural, similarly we should not have to invoke supernatural laws in a discussion of free-will.

A stickier question, at least for the compatibilist, is what is meant by "I". It's a shortcut to say that whatever is in the brain is the I, because it's not — there are many things in the brain that are not the I, and some, Buddhists, contend there isn't even an I. Equating the brain with the I is largely handwaving, albeit handwaving which many materialists have fought hard to sell.

That question, in my opinion, is the crucial point which must be settles before the discussion of free-will even begins. But this is not a question that can be resolved by looking at things reductionally, but holistically.

Drawing an analogy - what is a computer? Is it the CPU? The RAM? The motherboard? The keyboard? Mouse? Monitor? The hard-disk? Or is it the operating system?

None of these things can be singly pointed out to represent a "computer". Even if they are simply put together - in a bag - they still wouldn't be a computer. We need to put these component entities in a specific arrangement, make them capable of performing specific functions. Only then the emergent entity called "computer" can come into existence.

Similarly, we cannot keep pointing to parts of oneself and keep asking "Is that me?", when what "you" are, is the sum of it all, in a particular arrangement. So, no, you are not your brain. Atleast, you are not just your brain.