Do you believe in free will?

[genkaus]

Your position has always been a fundamentally contradictory one, here you claim the choice is both free from coercion, but certain and inevitable.

Is it my position in free-will that is contradictory or is it yours?

Your error is your equating certain with coerced. Coercion presupposes existence of a consciousness with the capacity to act contrary to its motivation. Certainty and inevitability do not indicate any necessary conflict between the action and motivation. The action maybe certain and inevitable - however, if the agent's motivation behind the action and the action itself are consistent with each-other, then the action is uncoerced.

You idea of free-will entails that it should be free of causation at the same time being part of the causal chain that leads to the action. That position is necessarily self-contradictory, which is why that idea of free-will can never be true.

I would avoid using the phrase "you did the determining" because the causes of this determination are empirically traceable, although fundamentally nigh-impossible to fully comprehend. Your "determining" is "determined" by natural causes, and therefore coerced into a certain decision.

Actually, when considering the question of free-will, it is the efficient cause that is considered - not the ultimate cause. If we sought the ultimate cause of each action, then there is only one ultimate cause and all actions would cease to hold any meaning.

The causes of determination are empirically traceable, but regarding free-will, they need only be traced to the agent, because it is that capacity of the agent that is in question. Any further investigation about the cause of the agency would be irrelevant to the issue of its capacity - once such a capacity is established.

It is coerced, and there is no alternatives, it is not free will. You really want to call it free will, but it really does contradict the definition you agreed as true.

There is no alternative outcome, but the choice is not coerced if the efficient cause of the choice is the agent and there is no conflict between his motivation and action. So, it really doesn't contradict the definition of free-will that you gave.

Sadly, as we concluded earlier, our discussion cannot overcome this contradiction.

When did we conclude any such thing?