(March 26, 2012 at 9:10 am)NoMoreFaith Wrote: You argument works only from finite regress. You stop the buck at motivation offering no further causation.
Where did the motivation come from? Did it come from somewhere other than the neuron activity of the brain? I know you don't think that. So why do you stop the regression at motivation.
Because, it is at that point, the question of coercion stands answered. Once you have shown that the motivation and the action were in line with each-other, you've shown that no coercion was present - therefore, the action was an exercise of free-will.
(March 26, 2012 at 9:10 am)NoMoreFaith Wrote: Agreed. Your argument is purely from the illusion created by the causal forces, and call the illusion, free will.
Read my argument again and point out where the motivation and the action become inconsistent - thereby negating free-will?
(March 26, 2012 at 9:10 am)NoMoreFaith Wrote: So physiological imbalances which cause psychotic episodes should not be considered, because it is the capacity of the agent that is in question? This is part of the capacity of the agent then yes? What else should we consider? Their blood sugar levels? Seratonin levels? Where do you draw the line. Where does free will start, and determinism end?
You've mired yourself so deep in the dichotomy that you cannot see that wherever free-will may start - determinism doesn't end.
As for where free-will starts, that is determined by what constitutes the self of an agent - a question there is no clear answer to as of yet - as there is none to the question of the role these factors have in determining what an agent is.
(March 26, 2012 at 9:10 am)NoMoreFaith Wrote: I refer back to the finite regress of motivation. What "motivates" the motivation and so on and so forth. Where is the line you draw.
I told you. Where free-will is concerned, I draw the line at answering the question of whether any coercion was present.
(March 26, 2012 at 9:10 am)NoMoreFaith Wrote: When we noted that the definition of "illusion of free will" is equivalent to your "free will". It precludes any further discussion on the matter apart from how you define free will itself.
Yes, I recall you saying something of the sort. I also recall saying that though functionally similar, these two were fundamentally different - the former being the result of irrational understanding of what constitutes an agent and mistaken view of what free-will is supposed of be free of. Further, how you define (or rather understand) free-will would be critical in determining whether its real or illusory. So, no, no agreement was reached on the subject.