Do you believe in free will?

[tackattack]

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1a-Even in the worst cases of brain damage or mental reprogramming, I’ve yet to see someone lose that irreducible sense of self I deem as the agent. I think this is largely due to a large tie between identity and experience. I believe that since we experience things in the now and the movement of our timeline is constant, who we are at any moment is inexplicably tied to each moment. As long as moments continue independent of self, the self experiences passing through that timeline. As long as I am experiencing the temporal self moving through the now, I have an irreducible identity. That to me is as fundamentally real as the passage of time.

Yes, but do you consider that self to remain the same throughout or change according to time? By your answer here, I'd say the latter.

Secondly, what do you mean by irreducible? For example, a person in a coma has no consciousness due to the brain damage. Would you still consider him to have the sense of self?

1b- As no successful attempts have changed this irreducible identity, at least that portion of consciousness remains unknown as to its location. Certainly though it’s not in the material as all brain function can cease and (upon its resuscitation) the majority of the identity is intact. Even in cases of coma where it has been shown that no record of time is kept with consciousness (people waking up thinking it’s 20 years ago) identity still exists.

This part is inconsistent with what you said previously. While claiming the "self" to have irreducible identity, you did not assert that it is independent of the timeline.

Further, your absence of knowledge as to its location is not argument for its immateriality. In fact, the examples you provided work against the assumption. The self could be considered both irreducible and emergent, i.e. it arises from a particular configuration of the brain (emergent) but cannot exist if any part of it is taken away (irreducible). You examples show that as long as that particular configuration exists, the self exists - irrespective of any intermediate time when that configuration did not exist.

2a-at the very least will exist as a useful abstract thought. I believe conscious (read as self-aware consciousness or ego) use of will is a driving force implementing desires and thus is a huge functional part of the causal chain in personal action. While not certain, I find ego driven will reliable and axiomatic that I can force myself to act contrary to the way my id or nature desires me to act.

Mostly ok. Few nitpicks though. Firstly, you cannot consider this position axiomatic if it is based on your view of the "self" as it seems to be. Secondly, your nature is not the same as your id - it includes your id as well as your conscious will. So, while you can act against your will, you cannot act against your nature.

2b- I would say will exist in the consciousness. Sometimes the id uses it and we act (seemingly) involuntarily, sometime the ego uses it (free or coercion). It seems to span both but residing squarely in the conceptual mind. This mind could be the sum of concepts and entirely an illusory fabrication of synapses firing. With the limited number of genomes and vastly expansive amount of synapses I know that the genome isn’t creating a mind with its genetic plans. If the 1000 billion or so synapses is even able to permanently record every bit of experienced information in a lifetime is yet to be seen as well, and I don’t think it’s simply big enough to hold the sum total of consciousness. Even if we could read exact thoughts and implant those thoughts into someone else it doesn’t make the mind strictly visible. It merely concludes that expression of the mind must be done through the window of the physical brain.

This is the point where your justified answers end. You haven't shown any justification for the position of non-physical mind - except for the lack of ignorance about the complete physical explanation. Ergo, your argument here of "simply not big enough" is argument from incredulity.

3a- If run by the id it’s out of direct control and therefore under the influence of instinctual drives and beliefs. If run by the ego it’s directly controlled by the self-aware ego part of the consciousness and free from influence.

Free from influence of the id, but not the ego. An important distinction.

3b-This comes from the feedback loop between the id and ego with relation to identity. “Who I am” is a function of the super-ego and this feedback loop. “Who I am” drives my will and can influence “who I am”, go against the ego or the id and can thus be independent of coercion.

The problem I have here is that you are considering all three - id, ego and super-ego as three different entities. Within the context of the question of "Who I am" - you are answering - my super-ego, not my id or ego. Thus, you can claim coercion in case of id/ego-directed action. I see all three subsumed in the identity and therefore do not consider it coercion in case of id/ego driven behavior. Thus, my question here is, on what basis do you separate the identity of a person from his id or ego?

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1a- It is the latter, but not because of the passage of time, but the receipt of input. As long as the consciousness receives inputs it changes and thus changes identity. I define irreducible as unable to be lessened. Secondly can you prove that a person has no consciousness in a coma? I believe that, while they can't express, if they can receive input they would still have a consciousness. For instance, after Joe is in a coma for 20 years for brain damage, he wakes up. He's still Joe, He didn't experience the passage of those 20 years and may act differently, but he still perceives himself as Joe.

1b- I would say the self is the sum of a lot of things. It's in part who we perceive ourselves consciously to be, out nature, what we know, memories, Time that we've experienced, etc. Take all those away and I still feel there is a sense of agent that is irreducible. That is typically what I'm trying to identify and talk about when discussing self and duality vs. monism. If you would be so kind as to point out exactly how that is inconsistant with my 1a, I will reassess it. AAlso I'm fairly new to emergent properties and such, please explain it in more detail so I could evaluate it.

2a- I think I see where we're having a divergence. You define nature to include both your id and conscious will. I should be perhaps more specific and refer to it as our naturalistic instinctual nature. Hopefully that helps clear that up. I agree with your point about axioms and subjectivity.

2b- If all brain activity were to cease how would there exist any aspect of consciousness. How would you explain consciousness' dependance on the brain? Is it the electrical activity, the configuration of the synapses? I can fully admit I don't know where the mind would reside, if not in the brain, but I'm working on it.

3a- OK

3b- OK on the grounds that, due to how it functions, it is unobservable to self. I, for instance, know that part of who I am comes from who I am genetically built to be. Part of who I am is who I learned to be. Part of me is what I've experienced, remembereed and not. Part of who I am though, is also who I consciously choose to be. Colloquially when I refer to who I am, it's only the part of me I can perceive, which would not include the parts of my sub-conscious I can not see because I'm consciously expressing it. Objectively all parts of the whole would make the sum of the formal "who am I" agent definition.