Epicurean Paradox

[Drich]

In the interest of brevity, I'll stop here. If you can demonstrate the Epicurean Paradox affirms the consequent, you've demolished it, full stop. A better question would be why wouldn't you address him head on if his reasoning is fallacious? If you can, perhaps you'll be kind enough to to demonstrate the fallacy you believe is contained in the argument?

Affirming the consequent, sometimes called converse error, is a formal fallacy, committed by reasoning in the form:

1.If P, then Q.
2.Q.
3.Therefore, P.
An argument of this form is invalid, i.e., the conclusion can be false even when statements 1 and 2 are true. Since P was never asserted as the only sufficient condition for Q, other factors could account for Q (while P was false).

The name affirming the consequent derives from the premise Q, which affirms the "then" clause of the conditional premise.

If we can agree on the definition the look to the Opening post for your demolition

I'm familiar with the form of the argument, glad to see we can agree on that. The next step is to show how the Epicurean Paradox commits this particular fallacy. It is not evident to me. Please consider me as slow-minded as the average Oxford philosphy professor who has missed the critical flaw in the paradox that would gain me considerable fame had I spotted it. Remember that the paradox is only a problem for the God of theodicy (tri-omni) and you've already conceded that your version of God is not omni-benevolent, which is a valid way to evade the paradox. Now you're claiming that you didn't even have to concede that much, because the form of the paradox is inherently fallacious, making the conclusion (there is no tri-omni God) necessarily invalid.

I'm no philosopher, but it seems to me, the elements of the paradox take this form:

1. If P, then not Q.
2. Q.
3. Therefore, not P.

This is a valid argument, not fallacious.

1. If everyone had enough food, no one would starve.
2. Some people starve.
3. Therefore, not everyone has enough food.

1. If God had the power and desire to prevent all evil, there would be no evil.
2. There is evil.
3. Therefore, there is no God with the power and desire to prevent all evil.

As it was demonstrated in the OP the paradigm of the argument shifted when the the definitions of sin and evil were biblically defined. Evil is not a cosmic force to be reckoned with as Epicurus has identified. Evil is an allowance or rather evil is the proof/result of free will. Evil is not the opposing cosmic force that the challenges the authority of God, but rather an allowance or gift of God.

(P)

If God had the power to prevent all evil there would be no evil

(A misconception based on a false presumption to the nature of evil)

(Q)

There is indeed evil

(God gave the gift of free will as a result men produced evil. Evil is a right or is a direct result from a misused gift of God.)

(Therefore p)

God does not have the power to prevent evil.

So to recap:

1.If P, then Q.
2.Q.
3.Therefore, P.
An argument of this form is invalid, i.e., the conclusion can be false even when statements 1 and 2 are true. Since P was never asserted as the only sufficient condition for Q, other factors could account for Q (while P was false).

This is the definition is it not?

Have I not demonstrated that "Since P was never asserted as the ONLY Sufficient condition for Q, Other factors (Like the ones I listed) could account for Q (While p was false)
Which satisfies the requirements for affirming the consequent does it not? Regardless of what you think of the biblical definitions, even if you took the biblical definitions of of this equation, Epicurus has still affirmed the consequent. How you ask? Because the conclusion can be false even when statements 1 and 2 are true. Since P was never asserted as the only sufficient condition for Q, other factors could account for Q (while P was false).