Epicurean Paradox

[mediamogul]

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.

To be willing does not necessitate actual doing. For example, I'm willing to call my best friend bob, but that doesn't mean I'm going to (especially since that isn't his name). This also does not contradict omnipotence.

Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.

Once again, being able to do something as well as willing does not necessitate actual doing. Alternatively, is it malevolent to let your child choose not to study for a test, knowing full well that they will fail if they choose not to study?

Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?

To reiterate, being able and willing does not necessitate action.

Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

I think I've already addressed the prior faults in the argument.

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Overall, the argument isn't valid, and certainly isn't sound. It begs the question and fails to understand necessity. I don't really wish to analyze the validity of God or its characteristics, but when speaking of the paradox as a philosophical argument, one can't just apply it and expect it to pass as good logic.

Semantics. If god doesn't want evil to exist but is unable to prevent it then he is not omnipotent. If god wants evil to exist he is malevolent. If god doesn't want evil to exist and is able to prevent it then evil should not exist. If both then he is both malevolent and not omnipotent.

The whole argument against it is simply muddying the water. In its simplest form this argument represent a contradiction in terms of the most fundamental kind.