(April 13, 2012 at 11:24 am)Perhaps Wrote: Is it not true that cause exists as an identity separate from effect, yet they are dependent on one another? An entity cannot be conscious if the mechanism for consciousness is not physically present, that doesn't mean that the identity of the conscience is dependent on the existence of a physical mechanism. I can still talk about the thoughts and choices (conscience) made by Socrates without his physical mechanism (brain) being present. The conscience retains its identity while being causally linked to the physical brain.
Hey, I gave you the cause and effect analogy to show you that there both do have separate identities. Here, the requirement is simple. For a non-material entity called "the conscious mind" to exist, it must have a non-material mechanism of consciousness that is a part of its identity. The brain mechanism is not applicable because it is a material mechanism and according to you - a separate entity. You have never even mentioned a non-material mechanism of consciousness, much less demonstrated how it'd work. As it is, your argument doesn't stand.
(April 13, 2012 at 11:24 am)Perhaps Wrote: I can abstract about methods through which it may be possible that a non-material nature allows for interaction with physical causation, but they would simply be abstractions. The question of remaining independent of causation has been half answered already. The conscience is dependent on the physical brain, just as effect is dependent on cause, but past this dependency I don't believe that it is tethered to the line of causation which I think you are leaning towards. To illustrate this differently, if I die so does my conscience, but if an apple falls down beside me it doesn't effect my conscious decision in a deterministic manner - that is my belief. My justification for it not providing a deterministic choice is simply that I believe I have the ability to pick it up, or leave it, or get up and walk away, or... etc..
That is a very simplistic approach - something FNM often refers to as the illusion of free-will. In case of the apple, you are only conscious of the immediate cause - the apple falling beside you. You ignore all the other lines of causation, which, put together, would determine whether you pick up the apple or not. It is simply because you are unaware of them that you think you are making a free-choice.
(April 13, 2012 at 11:24 am)Perhaps Wrote: 1. The non-material can exist as an identity separate from the material, but its utilized existence is dependent on the material (I can't consciously act if I don't have a brain).
This doesn't explain how it exists, what exists in it and how it interacts with the material.
(April 13, 2012 at 11:24 am)Perhaps Wrote: 2. The conscious would be outside the deterministic causation of the material world (aside from being dependent on the brain), while still providing interaction with the physical world's causation the same way numbers and time are enacted upon the physical world.
Given the absence of any explanation of how the non-material interacts with the material, your assertion that consciousness would be outside deterministic causation is unsupported and meaningless. I can state with equal certainty here that "Consciousness, while existing in the non-material world, is completely determined by the causation of material world" and none of your given argument go against that.
(April 13, 2012 at 11:24 am)Perhaps Wrote: 3. The existence of free will isn't easily demonstrated if the observers already believe it to be determined materially. Just as I can't illustrate to you the fourth dimension, but I can draw you the shadow of a hypercube; I can't demonstrate to you the existence of the non-material conscience, but I can show you its effects (free will).
Then show me. You haven't done anything like that yet. All you have done is make unjustified assertions.
