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[Ryft]

Btw, nice to have you back

It's nice to be back, Adrian. I had really missed relaxing here.

What I am arguing is that there is no difference between saying "God created morality" and "morality is a product of God's divine nature." Both are a product of an attribute of God.

Except there is a significant difference. The problem, as I see it, resides in the term "created" and the sense it has of causing P to come into being or to bring P about—that is, its implication of a contingent state of affairs (i.e., could have been otherwise). Such a meaning is consistent with the divine command theory of ethics (DCT) but it simply cannot square with the divine nature theory of ethics (DNT) of Christian theism. It ebbs and flows from contradiction to fallacy. Consider: If P is eternal and immutable, then P was not caused by some S to come into being, or brought about by some S. Ergo, trying to use the word "created" to describe P either flies in the face of the very definition of the word (produces a contradiction) or flies in the face of what is actually asserted about P (produces a fallacy). The word "created" is just too problematic on this issue. (Although, as I said, it works fine for DCT.) And the problems are exacerbated as we explore your argument further.

For example, they emphatically are not both "a product of an attribute of God." The DNT is identified with the very nature of God, which is much more than any one attribute. The DCT, on the other hand, certainly can be described as a product of an attribute of God, viz. omnipotence or his creative powers. You said that "God created morality" has the same meaning as "morality is a product of God's creative powers." That is true only if given the DCT. God's creative powers is referenced under the attribute of omnipotence, so actually "God created morality" has the same meaning as "morality is a product of God's omnipotence," the power of divine fiat—which is the case only under the DCT, a theory that is not at any rate the subject of our discussion.

"Morality itself for humans is the sum of all the commands of God," you said, "and is therefore a creation of God." That is what the DCT argues for, Adrian. That is decidedly a different beast. Under the DNT, morality in itself for humans is (not the sum of his commands but) the sum of his nature, which is not the same thing as an act or an attribute. The word "created" simply cannot find any foothold in the DNT because under this theory morality is not identified with (i) an act of God, e.g., commands, nor (ii) an attribute of God, e.g., omnipotence or his creative powers. It is identified with the nature of God, which on the one hand is eternal and immutable, etc., and on the other hand is not the same thing as an act of God or an attribute of God.

I disagree. Science is based on the assumption that nature is ordered ...

Well no, sorry. That nature is ordered is not something assumed (a priori), it is something observed (a posteriori). Although science does progress from antecedent results, it is not based on those results in the axiomatic sense that I was referring to. Some of the unprovable assumptions that science is based on in the axiomatic sense being discussed were listed; e.g., science operates under the assumption that the laws of nature are uniform, but it cannot use those assumptions to prove the assumptions; as you recognized, that would be viciously circular. That is precisely why such assumptions are "baseless" or unprovable axioms.

But, as I said, just because a structure is built upon assumptions that cannot be proven, that does not in itself cut the rug out from underneath it (otherwise every structure built upon unprovable assumptions must be discarded, lest one commits the Special Pleading fallacy). And, thankfully, you agreed.

The point is that, if you assume something in an argument, the conclusion of the argument cannot be, "Well, the assumption was correct because everything works out."

That is by definition an a posteriori argument, Adrian. But the TAG is an a priori argument. It does not argue that P happens to work well with Q by an a posteriori evaluation. It is an a priori argument that in order for Q to be the case (e.g., human experience is intelligible) P must be the case; in other words, that P is the precondition necessary for Q to be the case. An a priori argument (analytic) by definition is not an a posteriori evaluation (empirical). If some assumption P is shown to be necessary in order for some case Q (which describes a real human experience), then one is justified in holding that P—and by "necessary" it is meant that every ¬P assumption fails to account for some case Q; i.e., the impossibility of the contrary.

I'm in full agreement. But the fact is, the TAG has a Christian assumption at the beginning and claims to be able to prove a Christian God. I see this as a fallacy, since the entire assumption was one of Christianity to begin with ...

First, as Cornelius Van Til noted, "all reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one another." For example, one who believes that human reason is the final arbiter of truth ultimately proves his point by appealing to human reason. Likewise an empiricist proves his case by appealing to empiricism. Similarly for a subjectivist, a Muslim, a Buddhist, or whoever. No one should be surprised, then, that the proof for Christian theism appeals to Christian assumptions as the ultimate criterion.

Second, the TAG proves the Christian God not by arguing to God, as a conclusion to be reached, but from God, as a presupposition necessary for any conclusion to be reached.

The problem I come across with this one [the DNT] is that morality is observably not static.

That holds only if cultural relativism is a true account of morality qua morality, which is decidedly not what the TAG argues. As I had said before, begging the question is not a valid criticism but a fallacy; it is faulty reasoning to think one view can be refuted by simply assuming the truth of another view.

[Perhaps you could] outline TAG as you see it, with a full explanation. It might be advisable to put your explanation on the Wikipedia article, to help future generations of atheists to "find" God.

First, I have indeed been outlining the TAG as I see it. Second, see here for a full explanation. Third, I am not invested in trying to help atheists generally to find God. As some at this site have said, even if God were proven to be true they would still refuse to obey him or have anything to do with him. If you may recall from my introduction thread, I am not here to convert atheist members to Christianity; although my private message box, as I had said, is wide open to anyone who is genuinely seeking, I am otherwise here just to engage in critical debate and discussion—or perhaps more pointedly, to test whether Christian arguments stand up under (valid and coherent) scrutiny.

[As a proof for God, the TAG] should be able to counter, successfully, any other claims of morality/knowledge/logic existing through any other means. These explanations exist, and the difference between them and the TAG—and the reason why they don't cause any 'outcry'—is because they are not presented as proofs, they are presented as explanations.

1. The TAG does successfully counter other claims. (This does not include, however, those who try to refute a view by assuming the truth of a competing view, because such a tactic is logically invalid and does not require being countered.)

2. These other claims or explanations are not presented as proofs... of?

Given that these [unprovable] assumptions are the prerequisites for the conclusion being valid, if we were to demonstrate how the assumption was wrong then the entire conclusion would be wrong. Ergo, there is no proof. A proof by definition cannot be disproven, and any "proof" based on assumptions can be disproven if the assumptions are disproven.

Right. But begging the question does not qualify as a disproof of anything. It is a logical fallacy, Adrian. One does not disprove X by assuming the truth of Y. One disproves X by disproving X, either under its own terms or by proving the truth of ¬X (proving, not assuming or stating).

The TAG argues that logic, knowledge, and morality cannot be explained without God. Your rebuttal against the TAG is, "Yes they can." Well for crying out loud, if all it takes to refute an argument is to beg the question, critical thinkers have really been wasting their time, haven't they? (Either that, or proving the failure of the TAG requires more than begging the question.)

My rebuttal of TAG is indeed "yes they can" ... Morality has an evolutionary history, and scientists think ...

First, "yes they can" is not a rebuttal but a fallacy; X is not refuted by simply assuming the truth of Y. Second, describing the details of a competing view does not a refutation make; X is not shown to fail by the mere existence of Y.

Box X has a hairbrush, a ball, and a Playstation 3.
Box Y has a hairbrush, and a ball.

X has all the attributes of Y, but it is not equal to Y because X has an extra attribute.

My apologies for not being as explicitly precise as I could be. I thought my parenthetical remarks were being precise in describing my point, but evidently you were able to think I was presenting two different points simultaneously. It was one and the same point. It is interesting that it takes one tiny phrase to be more precise:

If Deity X (DX) has all the attributes of the Christian God (CG) and vice-versa, then DX is CG (q.v. if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y). In order for DX to not be CG, it must have at least one attribute that is different from CG (q.v. a putative property which distinguishes them). Furthermore, as indicated earlier, making a claim is very easy to do. You can say moral order is grounded in noodly fields of spaghetti or whatever else tickles your fancy, but then comes the matter of whether or not it actually works.

Again, I thought my parenthetical remarks made that clarification. My apologies.

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Edits: Added the clause "and by 'necessary' it is meant that every ¬P assumption fails to account for some case Q; i.e., the impossibility of the contrary."