Conversion

[Tiberius]

Except there is a significant difference. The problem, as I see it, resides in the term "created" and the sense it has of causing P to come into being or to bring P about—that is, its implication of a contingent state of affairs (i.e., could have been otherwise). Such a meaning is consistent with the divine command theory of ethics (DCT) but it simply cannot square with the divine nature theory of ethics (DNT) of Christian theism. It ebbs and flows from contradiction to fallacy. Consider: If P is eternal and immutable, then P was not caused by some S to come into being, or brought about by some S. Ergo, trying to use the word "created" to describe P either flies in the face of the very definition of the word (produces a contradiction) or flies in the face of what is actually asserted about P (produces a fallacy). The word "created" is just too problematic on this issue. (Although, as I said, it works fine for DCT.) And the problems are exacerbated as we explore your argument further.

For example, they emphatically are not both "a product of an attribute of God." The DNT is identified with the very nature of God, which is much more than any one attribute. The DCT, on the other hand, certainly can be described as a product of an attribute of God, viz. omnipotence or his creative powers. You said that "God created morality" has the same meaning as "morality is a product of God's creative powers." That is true only if given the DCT. God's creative powers is referenced under the attribute of omnipotence, so actually "God created morality" has the same meaning as "morality is a product of God's omnipotence," the power of divine fiat—which is the case only under the DCT, a theory that is not at any rate the subject of our discussion.

"Morality itself for humans is the sum of all the commands of God," you said, "and is therefore a creation of God." That is what the DCT argues for, Adrian. That is decidedly a different beast. Under the DNT, morality in itself for humans is (not the sum of his commands but) the sum of his nature, which is not the same thing as an act or an attribute. The word "created" simply cannot find any foothold in the DNT because under this theory morality is not identified with (i) an act of God, e.g., commands, nor (ii) an attribute of God, e.g., omnipotence or his creative powers. It is identified with the nature of God, which on the one hand is eternal and immutable, etc., and on the other hand is not the same thing as an act of God or an attribute of God.

Fair enough, but the problem still remains in how this morality affects us. I can understand how a created sense of morality can be associated with humanity, but not how one which is simply "God's nature". God's nature includes many things which humans do not possess, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, etc. I guess what I'm asking is (a) how humans can have morality when it is not part of their own nature (or indeed not created as part of them), and (b) how something that is the nature of God can affect anything else at all.

Well no, sorry. That nature is ordered is not something assumed (a priori), it is something observed (a posteriori). Although science does progress from antecedent results, it is not based on those results in the axiomatic sense that I was referring to. Some of the unprovable assumptions that science is based on in the axiomatic sense being discussed were listed; e.g., science operates under the assumption that the laws of nature are uniform, but it cannot use those assumptions to prove the assumptions; as you recognized, that would be viciously circular. That is precisely why such assumptions are "baseless" or unprovable axioms.

But, as I said, just because a structure is built upon assumptions that cannot be proven, that does not in itself cut the rug out from underneath it (otherwise every structure built upon unprovable assumptions must be discarded, lest one commits the Special Pleading fallacy). And, thankfully, you agreed.

You contradict yourself, possibly because you got confused over what I meant by "order". I agree with you that science operates on the assumption that the laws of nature are uniform; this is what I meant by "ordered". In other words, the universe has an order to it, it doesn't randomly change for no reason; it follows "laws". That nature is "ordered" is both a priori and a posteriori in that it is the assumption by which science works, and also the observation that science returns to us. The observation cannot be used to prove the assumption because there may very well be a time in the future when our observation contradicts order, thereby showing us that our assumption is in err.

That is by definition an a posteriori argument, Adrian. But the TAG is an a priori argument. It does not argue that P happens to work well with Q by an a posteriori evaluation. It is an a priori argument that in order for Q to be the case (e.g., human experience is intelligible) P must be the case; in other words, that P is the precondition necessary for Q to be the case. An a priori argument (analytic) by definition is not an a posteriori evaluation (empirical). If some assumption P is shown to be necessary in order for some case Q (which describes a real human experience), then one is justified in holding that P—and by "necessary" it is meant that every ¬P assumption fails to account for some case Q; i.e., the impossibility of the contrary.

The problem I have with this is that I have given you ¬P assumptions that account for every aspect of Q. You just ignore them. Your assumptions I hold as ultimately unprovable in any case, as they require the Christian worldview to be true, and I argue that this is in itself unprovable. Your impossibility of the contrary only reveals TAG as a non-proof, for you cannot possibly know every single ¬P (given that there are an infinite number of them) in order to make the statement that every ¬P fails to account for some case Q. Further, as I have stated, there do exist ¬P which explain Q.

Second, the TAG proves the Christian God not by arguing to God, as a conclusion to be reached, but from God, as a presupposition necessary for any conclusion to be reached.

Yet we have agreed previously that any assumption or presupposition cannot be held as proven. If you state God as a presupposition for the argument that logic, knowledge, morality cannot exist, you cannot then state that God exists because your argument is apparently sound. I don't think your argument is sound for the reasons previously given, but even if it were, if God is a presupposition, and thereby an assumption to the argument from which the conclusion is drawn, you cannot hold it as a proof of God, which is the very assumption!

That holds only if cultural relativism is a true account of morality qua morality, which is decidedly not what the TAG argues. As I had said before, begging the question is not a valid criticism but a fallacy; it is faulty reasoning to think one view can be refuted by simply assuming the truth of another view.

I'm not assuming the truth of another view; I'm pointing out the observation that morality is not static. You are simply trying to shift the burden of proof, as it is your claim that morality is static and the "nature of God". I presented evidence against your claim, which is that morality is not static, as observed through history and through our understanding of morality as a product of society rather than anything else. If you have any evidence you want to put forward for your claim, I would love to hear it. However to say that this only holds if cultural relativism is a true account of morality qua morality is to commit the very fallacy you accused me of, namely, to assume the truth of the other view.

The TAG does successfully counter other claims. (This does not include, however, those who try to refute a view by assuming the truth of a competing view, because such a tactic is logically invalid and does not require being countered.)

No it doesn't. Simply saying it does doesn't make it so. I'm not assuming the truth of a competing view, I'm showing you the evidence and explanation of knowledge, morality, and logic. Your unacceptance of these explanations does not refute them, and if TAG was such a great proof, it would easily point out the flaws in the explanations, but it doesn't. It can't because TAG is not a proof of anything, it is yet another attempt at an explanation for the existence of such things, but it is no more. It cannot be held as a proof because there exist ¬P that account for every aspect of Q, and the entire proof relies on there no existing any ¬P that account for Q.

2. These other claims or explanations are not presented as proofs... of?

They are no presented as proofs of anything, that was the point. They are explanations of morality, knowledge, logic, based on what science tells us and what the best reasoning tells us. They could very well be wrong, which is why they nobody considers them "proofs". TAG considers itself a proof, but it does nothing to proof God because it is full of assumption, as well as the assumption that there are no ¬P that account for every aspect of Q when there are plenty of them, and even if there weren't any known about, it does not mean that they do no exist.

Right. But begging the question does not qualify as a disproof of anything. It is a logical fallacy, Adrian. One does not disprove X by assuming the truth of Y. One disproves X by disproving X, either under its own terms or by proving the truth of ¬X (proving, not assuming or stating).

I'm not begging the question at all. What I am pointing out to you is that a proof relies on an assumption to work, is not a proof at all. An assumption by definition can either be true or false, and if the assumption for which the "proof" is based turns out to be false, the entire proof itself is equally false unless it can work around the false assumption with another. If we held the assumption that 1 = 3, we can deduce that based on this assumption, 1 + 1 = 6. However it is easy to show in mathematics that 1 =/= 3, so the conclusion of 1 + 1 = 6 does not hold any longer.

Nowhere did I assume the truth of Y; the entire point of my point was to demonstrate how TAG is not a proof, given that it must rely on an unproven assumption to operate, and if that assumption was proven wrong, it would fall apart.

First, "yes they can" is not a rebuttal but a fallacy; X is not refuted by simply assuming the truth of Y. Second, describing the details of a competing view does not a refutation make; X is not shown to fail by the mere existence of Y.

X is a claim that there are no other explanations that account for something. To show that there are other explanations for that something is to show that X is wrong, or at least not a complete explanation of the "something". TAG claims that the Christian God is the only explanation for morality, knowledge, and ethics. This can be easily shown to not be the case by the other Gods scenario, which I have gone over.

If Deity X (DX) has all the attributes of the Christian God (CG) and vice-versa, then DX is CG (q.v. if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y). In order for DX to not be CG, it must have at least one attribute that is different from CG (q.v. a putative property which distinguishes them). Furthermore, as indicated earlier, making a claim is very easy to do. You can say moral order is grounded in noodly fields of spaghetti or whatever else tickles your fancy, but then comes the matter of whether or not it actually works.

The problem with this is that it is not what I argued. I didn't say "God X has all the attributes of the Christian God and vice-versa". I said that God X has all the attributes of the Christian God (one way). God X could have more attributes, for instance the ability to lie (a Christian pastor once told me that God cannot lie, so I hold this as my example). I am sure there are many other attributes that one could think of, so please explain how God X does not fit the requirements of TAG.