The Arrogance of Atheism

[Tiberius]

While that is true, it has little to do with the point of my argument. You see, it is not about the epistemic criteria atheists use to argue from their belief system (be what it may). It is about the epistemic criteria atheists expect Christians to use in arguing from theirs. Suppose that in the course of some discussion an atheist says to a Christian, "You would have to prove this God of yours exists in the first place," to which the Christian responds by pulling out his Bible. I don't expect he would get very far before the atheist interjects that the Bible is unacceptable criteria for establishing truth claims.

Well, now wait a minute: according to who? What standard produced that determination? The atheist's own epistemic structure, of course (which almost universally is some form of empiricism). He is presupposing the truth of his self-determined epistemology and expecting his Christian interlocutor to work within the framework thereof. The force of my argument is found in the fact that the Bible-determined epistemology of Christian theism has exactly equal validity as the one affirmed by the atheist—a conclusion that the atheist cannot present a counter-argument against that presupposes the truth of his epistemology, because to do so would commit the logical fallacy of Begging the Question (in virtue of epistemology itself being the subject).

According to who? According to logic. It is a fallacy to argue that a book proves a God, because if that were the case, any book could be used to prove anything. You could write a contradiction in a book "X = ¬X" and then say it is true because the book says so. Books are the words of men, and men are provably fallible. It is a variation of the argument from authority, which is a logical fallacy (you should know all about them). Just because a book says something does not mean it is (a) true, or (b) provable.

When the atheist pretends that his epistemic structure possesses the only legitimate criteria for establishing truth claims, prohibiting by fiat any competing epistemic structure, he is patently shoving his beliefs down the Christian's throat. This is the "arrogance" which my argument addresses.

I don't think atheists do pretend that their epistemic structure is the only legitimate criteria; I think that atheists support materialism and empiricism because they are the only structures that are able to accurately make predictions. Materialism only works for things that exist and can be observed / tested. If theists make the claim that God cannot be observed/tested, then materialism obviously does not cover it. Before they go any further, they must demonstrate how things that cannot be observed/tested can be said to exist at all, or demonstrate a way of determining the existence of these immaterial things without using materialism or empiricism. If you are able to do this, then you have a valid point, but so far you have no way of distinguishing an existent God from a non-existent one.

Unfortunately materialism, or metaphysical naturalism, begs the question on the issue, insofar as it asserts that "nature is all there is, and all basic truths are truths of nature"("Naturalism." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. 1996 Supplement, pp. 372-373). All things supernatural (e.g., God, souls, etc.) are asserted to be nonexistent prior to any investigation. Reality is said to be "such that there is nothing but natural things, forces, and causes of the kind that the natural sciences study," rejecting out of hand "the objective existence of any supernatural thing, force or cause" ("Metaphysical naturalism." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia).

And it further begs the question on another, more pertinent level. Why someone prefers metaphysical naturalism is biographically interesting, but when it comes to a competition about epistemology it is question-begging to presuppose its truth. And begging the question is a logical fallacy, an error in reasoning.

It does not beg the question; it uses the assumption that nature is all there is and bases explanations on that assumption. This is how science works, and we've already discussed how such things are not "begging the question" in the TAG debate. All arguments are based on some assumption, and materialism is based on the assumption that nature is all there is.

That said, if materialism is question begging as you claim, I fail to see how any other philosophical position like spiritualism or idealism is not begging the question.

The fact is, we should make the assumption that nature is all there is, until such evidence (or reasoning) comes forward that this assumption is wrong. Nature is all we can test and observe, so to suppose that there is some other realm which we cannot test or observe is to do the exact same question begging, just without the actual evidence in support of it.

Such is precisely what my argument does. It is equally valid by virtue of the inescapable absence of any means of evaluating a competition of epistemology that does not beg the question.

How does it? It cannot explain how things can be known about the spiritualism realm, it only asserts that materialism is begging the question (I say it is not), and then proceeds to say that "if it is alright for materialism to beg the question, it is ok for spiritualism to beg the question". That is not a logically sound argument, even if materialism is begging the question. If both beg the question, both should be rejected. I hold though, that materialism does not beg the question, as it does not asusme it's truth; rather it has the assumption that nature is all there is, and materialism itself is based upon that.