Conversion

[Ryft]

Fair enough, but the problem still remains in how this morality affects us. I can understand how a created sense of morality can be associated with humanity, but not how one which is simply "God's nature." God's nature includes many things which humans do not possess, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, etc. I guess what I'm asking is (a) how humans can have morality when it is not part of their own nature (or indeed not created as part of them), and (b) how something that is the nature of God can affect anything else at all.

The relationship between the DNT and our own moral compass is explicated in the doctrine of imago Dei (i.e., created in the image of God). We were designed to be sensitive and responsive to the ethical and rational normatives contained by our Creator. This is why only Judeo-Christianity can speak rationally and intelligibly about behavior and noetic equipment both functioning properly, a normative standard about how faculties ought to function (viz. something functions 'properly' insofar as it functions the way it is intended or ought to). When the atheist uses such language he is stealing intellectual currency that his own worldview cannot produce; any concept that relies upon or involves purpose or design is unintelligible under an evolutionary framework because selective forces in nature are adaptive, not teleological. The consistent atheist never utters statements about normative functioning, but rather (as per Plantinga) only statements about descriptive functioning, which is epistemically and ethically impotent. The matter is worse than this but I do not want to digress too far.

I agree with you, that science operates on the assumption that the laws of nature are uniform. That is what I meant by 'ordered' ... That [the laws of nature are uniform] is both a priori and a posteriori insofar as (i) it is the assumption by which science works and (ii) the observation that science returns to us.

That the laws of nature are uniform is actually not something that science returns to us. What we know a posteriori is that the laws of nature in this locality are consistent with the laws of nature in that locality, but by no means does that prove "the laws of nature are uniform" throughout every locality—especially when it is recognized that we've barely explored but 5% of the known universe. The uniformity of nature's laws is something we have assumed prior to investigation, not something we concluded from investigation. Moreover, assuming such a priori is what allowed us to even consider a posteriori investigations in the first place. Same goes for other assumptions by which science operates but cannot itself prove, like inductive inference which (as per Hume) cannot be proven except inductively, which is viciously circular. This is why 'logical positivism' in the early 20th century, and its bastard offspring 'scientism' today (see The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2005), are paralyzing dialectical loops and therefore irrational.

The problem I have with this is that I have given you ¬P assumptions that account for every aspect of Q.

Correction: you propose that ¬P assumptions adequately account for every aspect of Q. Whether or not it actually succeeds is quite a different matter, which our present discussion has not in any way examined. Until such an analysis is had, it is not a valid refutation of the TAG—hence the force of my rebuttal, that the TAG is not disproven by assuming the truth of a competing view. Do your ¬P assumptions succeed? The TAG contends that they do not, under an internal critique of their own terms (q.v. the "naturalistic fallacy" as per Moore, the "is/ought problem" as per Hume, the "arbitrary criteria" as per Butler, etc.). For example, under the ¬P-influenced framework you proposed, ethical statements are not normative and, therefore, are not even ethical statements (because ethics by definition are normative).

But now observe the extraordinary cognitive dissonance produced by what you argue next:

Your assumptions I hold as ultimately unprovable in any case, as they require the Christian worldview to be true, and I argue that this is in itself unprovable.

Adrian, do you not even realize how horrifically self-defeating this is? If we must reject as unprovable anything that is built upon unprovable assumptions, then we are left with Nihilism. Every product of human thought—including the esteemed natural sciences—is built upon some unprovable assumption or other, and therefore (by your above argument) must likewise be rejected as unprovable. Moreover, this includes and therefore destroys the basis of your above argument, and therefore the argument itself. (Notice, too, that it defeats your argument that ¬P assumptions account for every aspect of Q.) I would recommend abandoning such a position because the only thing it offers is a paralyzing dialectical loop.

[The TAG fails because] you cannot possibly know every single ¬P (given that there are an infinite number of them).

There are not an infinite number of ¬P. There is a finite number of them by definition; namely, just one. Butler draws our attention to Förster's point that transcendental arguments do not "set out to provide a uniqueness proof by refuting an indefinite or infinite number of worldviews. Rather the proof is provided by refuting the negation of the conceptual scheme or worldview that one is attempting to establish" (which in our discussion is identified as ¬P). Bahnsen articulated the point clearest when he indicated that every competing view is united at the basic level in setting aside the Christian conception of God: "The indirect manner of proving the Christian position is, thus, to exhibit the intelligibility of reasoning, science, morality, etc., within the context of biblical presuppositions ... and then to make an internal criticism of the presuppositions of autonomous thought (in whatever form it is presently being discussed) in order to show that it destroys the possibility of proving, understanding, or communicating anything" (Bahnsen, Greg L. Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1998. Print. pg. 489. See also: Förster, Eckart. "How are Transcendental Arguments Possible?" Reading Kant. Eds. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Print. pp. 3-20; Van Til, Cornelius. A Survey of Christian Epistemology. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969. Print. pg. xi).

If you state God as a presupposition for the argument that logic, knowledge, and morality exist, you cannot then state that God exists because your argument is apparently sound.

Either you are ignoring what the TAG does or you're trying to deny a tautology, for the TAG does not simply state God as a presupposition but rather argues that God is a necessary precondition. And if the argument proves that P is necessary in order for Q, then we most certainly can state that it has proven that P is necessary in order for Q. It follows tautologically. You can deny that the argument has made its case, but you cannot say that by making its case it has not made its case.

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MISCELLANY:

But even if [the TAG were sound], if God is a presupposition and thereby an assumption to the argument from which the conclusion is drawn, you cannot hold it as a proof of God, which is the very assumption!

The logical structure known as modus ponens is formally valid:

1. If Q (morality), then P (God)
2. Q (morality)
3. Therefore, P (God).

The TAG is that by which we establish the first premise, by arguing (not merely stating) that God is a necessary precondition (not merely a convenient assumption).

I'm not assuming the truth of another view; I'm pointing out the observation that morality is not static.

Let me prove that you are, by having you answer the following question: Is the proposition "morality is not static" true?

If you have any evidence you want to put forward for your claim [that morality is absolute], I would love to hear it.

Okay: the DNT, as defended by the TAG.

Your unacceptance of [competing views] does not refute them.

True. But I never suggested such a thing in the first place. I said "the TAG does successfully counter other claims," by working to show that they refute themselves under an internal criticism of their own terms. If ¬P is impossible, then P is proven.

If the TAG was such a great proof, it would easily point out the flaws in the explanations, but it doesn't.

Instead of responding with a tedious "yes it does," let me instead request of you: What internal critique of a competing view have you observed the TAG failing to prove the flaws of? (Note: you cannot point to anything in our present discussion because no internal critique of a competing view has taken place yet.)

P is the claim that there are no other explanations that account for Q.

Incorrect. P would be delusional if it claimed such a thing, for there are many ¬P-influenced explanations for Q. Rather, it claims that ¬P cannot successfully account for Q, by an internal critique of its own terms.

I didn't say "DX has all the attributes of CG and vice-versa." I said that DX has all the attributes of CG [but not vice-versa]. DX could have more attributes, for instance the ability to lie. (A Christian pastor once told me that God cannot lie, so I hold this as my example). I am sure there are many other attributes that one could think of, so please explain how DX does not fit the requirements of the TAG.

If DX can lie, then he could deceive us in what he reveals about himself to us, and therefore we have no trustworthy means of defending the TAG (based as it is on DX's revelation).