Argument from perpetual identity against naturalism.

[Angrboda]

This is demonstrably false.

a) at one point, I was a Buddhist.
b) I am not a Buddhist today.
c) today I hate Buddhists.
d) I do not hate myself.

These four cannot be simultaneously true and refer to the same "I". I am most certainly not who I was when I was younger. I think you're glossing over distinctions and perhaps equivocating (I am my mind, in some real sense, and that is in constant change).

The Buddhists have the doctrine of Anatta, or no-self, which asserts that there is no permanent, durable self. If this were just a bare assertion, it would hardly impress; however, they have many clever arguments and examples supporting the notion that there is no self. While I don't necessarily agree with them, you can't just dismiss their arguments offhand.

As Heraclitus said, "You cannot step into the same river twice." Nor will you find the same person at any two moments separated in time. (See also the ship of Theseus paradox.)

I have my own theory of the self, but that's something entirely different from both the proposition that there is a perpetual self, and that there is no self. The premise of a perpetual self is far from self-evident, and you've justified it with nothing.