Since this thread seems to have the potential for an interesting discussion and possibly new insights for me, I'll break from my own practice and start with an unjustified assumption.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that humans do have an identity that can be regarded - in a sense of the word - as perpetual. Let us assume that there is a fundamental, unchanging self remains the same from your birth to your death. And that any apparent changes are simply to its mode of manifestation and not to the identity itself. Make no mistake - I am being illogical here. I'm starting out with a conclusion and choosing premises to support it. And since it makes the argument seem more rational, I will start out as if I don't know where I'm going and in doing so there may be considerable redefinition of concepts involved - but then, even their refutation might teach me new things.
Since the primary contention here is the inherent incompatibility of naturalism and perpetual identity, we'll start there. Specifically, the first premise that if naturalism was true, humans would not have a perpetual identity (I know, I changed it a bit. But actually having a perpetual identity seemed like a better argument than knowing that you have perpetual identity). So, we start by assuming that naturalism is true - which would mean that metaphysically, the physical world is all that exists and that everything else - consciousness, ideas etc are ultimately reducible to it.
Given this the classical definition of identity becomes functionally irrelevant. Nothing can remain same as itself in the next moment since even its constituents are in constant motion. If identity means being completely same with itself, then there can be no such thing as a perpetual identity and the idea of instantaneous identity is a dead-end, since it has changed in the next moment. If identity is to be a useful concept it has to be reinterpreted.
Let's take the example of the famous ship and go from there. While the question of identity arises when the planks are replaced, no one argues that it is changing if they remain the same. Ideally, this should be the case, since we know that the planks are decaying, the rip in the mast is getting wider and the spatial orientation is turning. Thus we can say that what is considered as identity are the few central characteristics that subsist through time and space. Everything else is a consequence of those characteristics and any change in them does not signify a change in the identity of the ship.
The consequence of this position is that as long as those central aspects remain the same, other changes would not affect its perpetual identity. So, as long as the identifying aspects of the ship remain the same, replacing the planks would not change its identity. Given the presumption of naturalism, however, its identity would be the consequence of what physically forms the ship. So, while the old planks no longer contribute to maintaining the ships identity, the new planks take over that function, thus maintaining its identity perpetually and being integrated into the ship itself. So, we can say that as long as there is no change in fundamental aspects any other changes are integrated into its identity. The conclusion then for Theseus' ship is that as long as you replace the ship's parts piece by piece, its original identity persists due to perpetual existence of the identifying characteristics.
Other incarnations of this paradox can be resolved using this logic. The river remains the same even if water comes in and goes out continuously. The ship built from the old planks is then a different ship. Socrates and Plato have not actually exchanged carriages simply by exchanging them part by part. Locke's sock remains the same even after being patched up and so does Washington's axe. And so on.
Regarding human consciousness, let's say that the very existence of a working brain gives rise to something fundamental and unique - depending upon the brain's structure - that remains unchanging and constitutes a person's identity. Then we can say that it wouldn't matter if brain cells die and new ones take their place - as long as the same function is performed and those fundamental aspects remain, the persons identity persists. Even if other aspects of personality change (what constitutes the other - that I have no idea of, since I have no idea as what would constitute the identifying features for a human), the identity remains the same.
Given this explanation, identity does seem to be both perpetual and compatible to the naturalist position. Therefore, the first premise of the argument - that naturalism is incompatible with the concept of perpetual identity - does not hold, thereby refuting the rest of it.
Wow. Even in writing of this argument, I saw so many holes that I can write another post refuting my own arguments. Alright then, let's see where this leads.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that humans do have an identity that can be regarded - in a sense of the word - as perpetual. Let us assume that there is a fundamental, unchanging self remains the same from your birth to your death. And that any apparent changes are simply to its mode of manifestation and not to the identity itself. Make no mistake - I am being illogical here. I'm starting out with a conclusion and choosing premises to support it. And since it makes the argument seem more rational, I will start out as if I don't know where I'm going and in doing so there may be considerable redefinition of concepts involved - but then, even their refutation might teach me new things.
Since the primary contention here is the inherent incompatibility of naturalism and perpetual identity, we'll start there. Specifically, the first premise that if naturalism was true, humans would not have a perpetual identity (I know, I changed it a bit. But actually having a perpetual identity seemed like a better argument than knowing that you have perpetual identity). So, we start by assuming that naturalism is true - which would mean that metaphysically, the physical world is all that exists and that everything else - consciousness, ideas etc are ultimately reducible to it.
Given this the classical definition of identity becomes functionally irrelevant. Nothing can remain same as itself in the next moment since even its constituents are in constant motion. If identity means being completely same with itself, then there can be no such thing as a perpetual identity and the idea of instantaneous identity is a dead-end, since it has changed in the next moment. If identity is to be a useful concept it has to be reinterpreted.
Let's take the example of the famous ship and go from there. While the question of identity arises when the planks are replaced, no one argues that it is changing if they remain the same. Ideally, this should be the case, since we know that the planks are decaying, the rip in the mast is getting wider and the spatial orientation is turning. Thus we can say that what is considered as identity are the few central characteristics that subsist through time and space. Everything else is a consequence of those characteristics and any change in them does not signify a change in the identity of the ship.
The consequence of this position is that as long as those central aspects remain the same, other changes would not affect its perpetual identity. So, as long as the identifying aspects of the ship remain the same, replacing the planks would not change its identity. Given the presumption of naturalism, however, its identity would be the consequence of what physically forms the ship. So, while the old planks no longer contribute to maintaining the ships identity, the new planks take over that function, thus maintaining its identity perpetually and being integrated into the ship itself. So, we can say that as long as there is no change in fundamental aspects any other changes are integrated into its identity. The conclusion then for Theseus' ship is that as long as you replace the ship's parts piece by piece, its original identity persists due to perpetual existence of the identifying characteristics.
Other incarnations of this paradox can be resolved using this logic. The river remains the same even if water comes in and goes out continuously. The ship built from the old planks is then a different ship. Socrates and Plato have not actually exchanged carriages simply by exchanging them part by part. Locke's sock remains the same even after being patched up and so does Washington's axe. And so on.
Regarding human consciousness, let's say that the very existence of a working brain gives rise to something fundamental and unique - depending upon the brain's structure - that remains unchanging and constitutes a person's identity. Then we can say that it wouldn't matter if brain cells die and new ones take their place - as long as the same function is performed and those fundamental aspects remain, the persons identity persists. Even if other aspects of personality change (what constitutes the other - that I have no idea of, since I have no idea as what would constitute the identifying features for a human), the identity remains the same.
Given this explanation, identity does seem to be both perpetual and compatible to the naturalist position. Therefore, the first premise of the argument - that naturalism is incompatible with the concept of perpetual identity - does not hold, thereby refuting the rest of it.
Wow. Even in writing of this argument, I saw so many holes that I can write another post refuting my own arguments. Alright then, let's see where this leads.
