Argument from perpetual identity against naturalism.

[genkaus]

Going back the ship, Genkaus said if central aspects remain the same, it's the same identity (in one sense). If this was true, humans in general can be said to be one identity or many humans to be of one identity because they share the same basic contruct. Obviously, when we think of ourselves as a person, we feel we continue to exist so as long as we don't die (and some people believe we continue to exist even after death). Moreover, in legends, people can even turn into animals (like some Jews being turned into Apes in Quran) or even TV shows or movies it happens, the point is we can imagine ourselves to be totally different, but that it's still "us".
What is this "I"? This I to me must be a soul.

That is a huge, unjustified leap.

If you are going to use my arguments, you'd do well to understand their implications first. Like I said, if the changes are minor and the central, identifying features remain the same, we consider the identity to persist and new changes to be integrated into it. What you missed is that once these changes are integrated, the main identifying features may not remain the same. Assume, for example, that your face is the identifying feature for your identity. Any changes taking place continuously over time are so small enough so as not to change your face completely and
these changes are integrated into it. Even so, gradually, your identity is changing, since you look nothing like what you did as a child. For having a functional and useful concept of identity, we are ignoring an important aspect of the reality of change which has to be accounted for.

Secondly, even if we consider there to be a basic construct that remains unchanged - which would be an incorrect assumption - there is no indication that this construct is the soul. It'd be one thing if you said, "let's call this construct one's soul" - in which case, you'd be redefining the word. But you have not justified that the classical definition - immaterial and supernatural aspect of a person's identity - applies here.

Now how do we prove we have knowledge of this continuous persisting I. I don't think it can be proven by argument but I think it can be proven by reflection.

If it can be proven by reflection, then it can be proven by argument.

Basically I believe the following faiths are properly basic and cannot be proven by an argument:

1) Faith in Free-will
2) Faith in Praise (and condemnation (it's opposite)/ inclusive of good and evil/ honor and dishonor)
3) Faith in family bond
4) Faith in human rights
5) Faith in justice
6) Faith in perpetual identity

Then you'd be wrong. Given that I've already provided arguments for perpetual identity here and in other threads I've given arguments for free will, justice and human rights and I have no automatic faith in praise or family bond - none of these would be considered basic and all would have to be proven by argument.

Naturalism wise, we can't be given knowledge of these things. They rather are there as beliefs because they work. It makes us flourish so we believe in it. It makes us act better so we believe in it.

On the contrary, given that I've never assumed supernatural while giving arguments for any of the above, I'd say that naturalism wise, we can have knowledge of these.

If naturalism is false, then being given knowledge of these things is very possible. It will be metaphysical spiritual knowledge.

Like I said before, it is incorrect to assume any of these as absolutes or take them to be true on faith. Further, the idea that of naturalism is false then the knowledge comes from some metaphysical, spiritual realm does not show that naturalism is actually false. Which is what you set out to do here.

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You mention identifying features. How do you identify features unless those features already exist awaiting to be identified? Or to put it another way, how can humans recognize patterns unless the patterns already exist?

You don't. We first need to identify and categorize patterns and features before we use them as identifying features.