Thank you for your reply. But aren't you explaining the moral phenomena? You're explaining, unless I've misunderstood you, how it may have come to pass that I - and others - have come to have the impression that there are external instructions with which we have reason to comply, whatever our interests. But for such impressions to be veridical there would need to actually be external instructions with which I have reason to comply whatever my interests. If my parents lie behind such impressions then I think you are right that the instructing nature of morality has been captured, we do not capture the rational authority. For I have no special reason to comply with instructions my parents issue to me. Granted, it may often be in my interests to comply with such instructions. But it will not always be, and plus moral instructions are instructions that somehow give rise to me having reason to comply with them. Whereas instructions from my parents (or my society etc) would only be ones I'd have reason to comply with if I happened to have interests that complying with them would serve.
So, if it is an essential feature of moral norms that they are norms that have categorical rational authority, then instructions from my parents or community are not going to qualify. Such things may be causally responsible for my having moral impressions - but they do not vindicate the impressions, they debunk them. Or so it seems to me at present.
So, if it is an essential feature of moral norms that they are norms that have categorical rational authority, then instructions from my parents or community are not going to qualify. Such things may be causally responsible for my having moral impressions - but they do not vindicate the impressions, they debunk them. Or so it seems to me at present.
