Atheism and morality

[Inigo]

I assume you cannot find a flaw in my reasoning or assumptions and so this is what you're driven to.

Once again, your assumption is incorrect.

The point of my posting that was the date on which it was posted, prefiguring the substance of your arguments.

Regardless, it appears that you have no takers on the first of your two syllogisms. However, since your argument requires both syllogisms to be true, perhaps you can set aside the dispute over the acceptability of the first syllogism and speak to why you think the second syllogism is valid and compelling. Why, if morality is instructions from some unspecified agent, does your second syllogism demonstrate the required characteristics that agent has to have in order for their instructions to qualify as morality? You've suggested that the Euthyphro dilemma might be an obstacle to your account, but beyond that, it's not clear to me that your second syllogism works either. While it's certainly possibly true that the reality that I might suffer for eternity for having sexual relations with another woman provides me a compelling reason not to have sexual relations with another woman, it's unclear how such infinite punishment in the afterlife yields an instruction that is morally compelling rather than simply compelling due to the nature of my self interests in a purely instrumental and non-moral way? (As a suggestion, you might create a separate thread, to allow the current debate over the first syllogism to continue its present trajectory.)

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Regarding the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition, this is one case where quoting an authority on the usage of the term is fallacious and invalid, as the current debate is about the very nature and substance of morality, so appealing to what a group of people think is the case is both an appeal to consensus and begging the question.

(Besides, much as I find the SEP useful, there are many annoying peculiarities about the composition of entries in the SEP, and if I have an option, I look elsewhere.)

Why do you think I give rat's arse what the Stanford said? Some other twit decided to quote its definition of morality and I merely noted that it accorded with mine and then showed that twit why such a thing would require a god.

You can define morality how you want. Define it as a pad of butter if you want. You won't be addressing me. For I have defined it as that which instructs with inescapable rational authority. It seems to be something of this nature that moral philosophers are concerning themselves with. Would you like some big names? YOu seem to crave the need for an authority figure. How about Kant? That do you?

Anyway, if - if - there is a god who has control over your interests in an afterlife and she doesn't want you having sex with another women and will mess you up big-time if you do, then you have reason not to have sex with another woman. And you have reason not to even if you really, really, REALLY want to. Want it all you like, you have reason not to.
That's what moral instructions are like. That's why I think moral instructions would need to be the instructions of a god of the kind I've just described.

You admit that you would indeed have reason to comply with such an instruction were one issued. But you say that this reason would be 'instrumental' and not 'moral'. That's question begging in this context. One cannot simply stipulate that moral reasons are not instrumental reasons: they may be. Granted, they do not appear to be. But that's precisely because moral reasons are inescapable whereas instrumental reasons are not.........unless a god of the kind I've just described exists!