RE: Atheism and morality
July 10, 2013 at 1:28 am
(This post was last modified: July 10, 2013 at 2:18 am by genkaus.)
(July 9, 2013 at 8:22 pm)Inigo Wrote: This has nothing to do with the definition of words. They're just labels. What I am doing is describing morality. I am describing how things seem when I sense that an act is wrong. For I use words like 'wrong' and 'morally bad' and 'morally obligatory' to refer to such bundles of features. Now, perhaps you don't. Perhaps you use the term 'morally wrong' to refer to a piece of cheesecake, or a feeling of devastation, or the first Tuesday of the month. Then you're just not talking about or analysing what I'm talking about.
If so, then it has everything to do with definitions. Definitions aren't labels, words are. Definitions do precisely what you claim to - describe the thing the word refers to. Nobody uses the term "morally wrong" as a label for cheesecake or Tuesday.
(July 9, 2013 at 8:22 pm)Inigo Wrote: However, it seems I am not unusual either in what I am labelling my moral experiences or in my use of that label. For so far in my life it appears to me that other people are using those terms to refer to exactly the same impression. And in moral philosophy I have read many articles and books in which the authors describe a relevantly similar experience and use the terms as I do. And so I conclude that we are all talking about the same thing.
Except, your use of label is wrong. I don't know which moral philosophies you've read, but you've clearly got them wrong. The author's description does not match your own.
(July 9, 2013 at 8:22 pm)Inigo Wrote: What I am referring to is an experience: an experience of something being externally instructed 'not to be done' and this 'not to be doneness' somehow giving rise in me to the belief that this act is one that I now have inescapable reason not to do.
Then you are not talking about morality at all. The moral experience or belief would be simply "something instructed not to be done thus giving rise to the belief that this act is one you have a reason not to do". It does not specify whether the instruction is externally given or internally created. It does not specify whether the reason not to do is inescapable or not. Thus, what you are describing here is a subset of morality - because it contains the aspects of morality but adds new ones. However, you cannot attach the label 'morality' to it because that label is already in use for a wider concept. If you want, you can call it gmorality.
(July 9, 2013 at 8:22 pm)Inigo Wrote: That's just the description, not the analysis. It is just a description of something I experience and form beliefs about. It was what Kant was talking about, it was what Socrates and Plato were talking about, and so on. They didn't call it 'morality' in ancient Greece. Doesn't matter. The label doesn't matter. They were talking about the same feature of their reality -the same experience and trying, just as we are, to make sense of it.
This is most certainly not what the others were talking about. In all three moral philosophies, the instruction is internally inferred - not externally issued. And only Kant claimed an inescapable reason in form of categorical imperative. Its clear that they are talking about things other than your gmorallity.
(July 9, 2013 at 8:22 pm)Inigo Wrote: So, once again, my premise that morality instructs, and my premise that morality's instructions aree ones that possess inescapable rational authority are just descriptions of the thing I am analysing.
And thus your premise is wrong. The thing that the label 'morality' describes does not have the property of having inescapable rational authority and since that label is already in use, you need to find another label - like gmorality.
(July 9, 2013 at 8:22 pm)Inigo Wrote: Then there's the analysis. That's where the real work happens. If you disagree with the description then really you're just not talking about what I am talking about and I'm frankly not interested in you, just as someone who uses the term 'atheism' to refer to the baking practices of 18th century Denmark would probably be surprised at this site and wonder why no-one was addressing the topic they were interested in.
Except, here the analogy applies to you - not anyone else. You are the one trying to use the label to describe something other than what it currently refers to. You are the one trying to redefine the word in order to perpetrate a tautological fallacy.
(July 9, 2013 at 8:22 pm)Inigo Wrote: My analysis is that morality must be composed of the intructions and favourings of a god. That's the raw ingredient. Just as if one wants to analyse, say, peanut butter one would reverse engineer it. One would see what combination of more basic ingredients would create something that had all the same qualities as the original. You discover that if you mash peanuts up with a bit of oil you get something that has all of the same features as peanut butter. If you find that there is no other way of creating those features then you've discovered what peanut butter is made of. That, in effect, is what I am saying about morality. Given the features I have described the only way that I can see that you could get such feature in reality is if there is a god of a certain kind.
I that case, your argument would be correct. Your gmorality refers to something that contains externally generated instructions from a rationally inescapable authority - and therefore, I'd accept that your gmorality is incompatible with atheism and cannot exist without a god.
But that's pointless. Morality is not your gmorality. Morality does not have the specification of being external or of having a particular authority. Gmorality is not what moral philosophers talk about when talking about moral theories. All you are doing, in effect, is saying "I'm redefining morality to be something that cannot exist without god. And therefore, my conclusion is that atheism is incompatible with morality".
(July 9, 2013 at 8:22 pm)Inigo Wrote: I am arguing first, that morality requires a god.
And trying to do so by redefining morality. Thus turning your entire argument into a particularly long form of "begging the question".
(July 9, 2013 at 8:41 pm)Inigo Wrote: Now, most of you atheists implicitly recognise the importance of reconciling the reality of morality with your worldview. For you recognise, at some inchoate poorly thought-out level, that unless you can do this your worldview has a serious deficiency. Something that appears very real, has to be considered a hallucination. This damages the credibility of the view. It damages it because to most of us morality appears more real than the reports of our sense of touch and sight (after all, it is conceivable that those are just hallucinations - it is conceivable, very conceivable, that I am dreaming right now). Yet it is far harder to conceive that there is nothing right or wrong with anything. That's precisely why the moral argument for a god's existence has real teeth and precisely why most of you feel it so important to deny what I am saying. it is why philoosphers are currently furiously working away at trying to show that morality is compatible with atheism (and failing - just take a look at their bonkers theories).
As a matter of fact, we atheists don't give a shit about your gmorality.
What we atheists talk about when we say "morality" and what you are talking about when you say "morality" are clearly two very different things.
We talk about "ideas regarding what should or should not be done". You are talking about "something containing externally issued instructions from a rational and inescapable authority about what should or should not be done".
I haven't met a single atheist who means the same thing by morality that you do. Come to think of it, other than those advocating the divine command theory, I haven't known any moral philosophers who use your definition of morality - which I'm calling gmorality for convenience - either.
No one is trying to reconcile your gmorality with atheism and no one is saying that gmorality is anything but a hallucination.
(July 9, 2013 at 8:41 pm)Inigo Wrote: For instance, the moral argument for 'a god' is very powerful.
You mean the gmoral argument for god? No, that's weal as well.
(July 9, 2013 at 8:41 pm)Inigo Wrote: I refer you to my arguments in which the existence of a god arrives as a conclusion to a deductively valid argument. That's the precise opposite of a non-sequitur.
If by deductively valid you mean using tautological fallacy - then yes.
(July 9, 2013 at 10:19 pm)Inigo Wrote: Yes they have. Me. I have presented arguments that establish that morality requires a god. Unless you actually address those arguments and show something to be wrong with the premises (which involves more than just nay saying) then I have done exactly as you asked. Deny that morality instructs and provide supporting considertaions. Deny that moral norms have inescapable rational authority and provide supporting evidence. Unless you can do that you're just nay saying. You just dislike the conclusion and infer that the argument must be faulty because a conclusion you dislike can't possible be true (or so I suggest).
All you have done is argue that your specific definition of morality requires a god. What your gmorality requires or doesn't require is irrelevant to actual morality.
(July 9, 2013 at 10:19 pm)Inigo Wrote: You think you can refute an argument with a head count do you? Even if every single philosopher thinks that morality does not require a god it does if my arguments are valid and sound. And that's that. You can head count all you want, it will never show there to be something wrong with the arguments. YOu acknowledge this to try and cover yourself. But then why mention the numbers unless you think it of some relevance?
When it comes to defining something - refutation by numbers is relevant and valid. If neither the commonly used definition of morality nor the definition used by past philosophers matches yours, then your definition is wrong and therefore your arguments are not sound.
(July 9, 2013 at 10:19 pm)Inigo Wrote: But one thing is also for certain: most moral philosophers recognise that there are incredible difficulties reconciling morality with an atheistic world view and none, NONE would be so foolish as to suggest that it has been done to anything remotely close to everyone's satisfaction!!!
On the contrary - no moral philosophers and especially no atheist moral philosopher has ever tried to reconcile what you mean by morality with an atheistic worldview. Many, however, have reconciled what morality actually means with an atheistic worldview and done so to everyone's satisfaction. Everyone except those like you whose definition of morality is different.
(July 9, 2013 at 10:19 pm)Inigo Wrote: We have a moral sense. It gives us the impression that there are instructions with which we have inescapable reason to comply.
Wrong. All our moral sense gives us is the impression that there are instructions. It does not indicate whether or not there is an inescapable or rather any reason to comply. That would be gmoral sense - which we don't have.
(July 9, 2013 at 10:19 pm)Inigo Wrote: There is only one way that I can see such things could be a reality and that is if a god exists.
Nope, such a sense can also be the result of perceiving a natural law in action as well. For a god, you'd need to add "externally generated instructions" to your gmoral sense as well. Oh wait, I forgot you did that already.
(July 9, 2013 at 10:19 pm)Inigo Wrote: This is evidence that such a god exists in the same way that your visual sense is evidence that there is an outside world.
Having a visual sense is a natural part of human anatomy. Having the hypothetical gmoral sense is not.
(July 9, 2013 at 10:19 pm)Inigo Wrote: I did. I wasn't impressed. You left out all the detail. Tell me about Hume's is/ought problem. You can't refute my position with vague gestures in the direction of something. And I can't defend myself against vague gestures. Put in the detail and we'll begin. If you can't put in the detail, well done - you've discovered you're prejudiced!!
Your inability to understand how Hume's law applies to your gmorality indicates your poor understanding of moral philosophies. The is-ought problem is the biggest stumbling block that any moral theory must overcome.
In your case, the simple fact of existence of god-given instructions is not sufficient - let alone inescapable - reason for compliance. Your personal, subjective desires necessarily play a part in its applicability. You say that if we don't follow the instructions given, we would be tortured in the afterlife - but that reason alone is not sufficient. There must be a personal desire not to be tortured. If I don't care what happens to me in afterlife or if I've found a way for their not to be one - such as cessation of my existence - then your gmorality is inapplicable and irrelevant to me.