If I understand it correctly, Hume's argument against miracles is essentially saying that people whom believe reports of miracles occuring are being inconsistent with their treatment of induction, yes? In other words, if you treat your induction that reports that person X is usually truth-telling as taking precedence over the your experience that, say, statues don't cry, you're being inconsistent.
Assuming I'm roughly right about Hume's argument, does it succeed? I've heard religious apologists say that the argument has long since been refuted (I know Swinburne's written on it, but I haven't read any of his works), but I myself don't have enough knowledge of philosophy to be aware of this apparent fact.
Assuming I'm roughly right about Hume's argument, does it succeed? I've heard religious apologists say that the argument has long since been refuted (I know Swinburne's written on it, but I haven't read any of his works), but I myself don't have enough knowledge of philosophy to be aware of this apparent fact.
