(July 26, 2013 at 11:38 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: I noted that the kind of free will is the so-called libertarian conception of free will, which can be generalized as the ability to have done otherwise than one did. I think it's bullshit - as does most of the philosophical community - but I'm almost certain that most theistic philosophers accept it since, for Christian theists, it is necessary to stop God from being morally responsible for the evil in his creation.
So that's what it means, that "one could have done otherwise". Then that brings a host of other problems with it - such as being based on mind-body dualism. It is also quite vague and leaves quite a lot of wiggle room.
(July 26, 2013 at 11:38 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: Either works for the argument I think. However, if theists choose the first option you listed then they are accepting the compatibilist view of free will which then necessitates God being morally culpable for evil and thus could have determined the world to not have evil; they can't have that, eh? So they've got to go with the 2nd option you listed: that God makes periodic alterations. But that then means that God's alterations will transgress, by virtue of interference, on some agent's ability to have chosen a different action.
But then that becomes compatibilism again - or certainly not libertarian free will - then, doesn't it? If God can rearrange the events and circumstances around you to necessitate that you act in some particular way, that's not the libertarian concept of free will that Abrahamic theists so badly need for their theodicies, despite its current conceptual incoherence.
I think the argument forces the theist to have to reject the libertarian concept of free will for compatibilism, but that then means they lose [their already fallacy-ridden] theodicies like the free-will defense response to the problem of evil.
The trick here is to regard god as another agent with his own agenda and with a higher capacity to alter events. Like I said, your conception of free-will leaves a lot of wiggle room.
Suppose at my workplace I'm up for promotion against two other guys. I know that one is a recovering alcoholic and the other has anger issues and while the company rules regarding separation of private and work life forbid me from revealing this to my boss, I know that these qualities would result in them being bad managers.
I also know that the angry guy hides a bottle of booze in his desk. So, I set things up as follows. I give the angry guy a file which I tell him that the alcoholic would be collecting later. I send a message to the alcoholic to take the file from the angry guy's desk at around 6. And I conveniently place a crowbar near my desk.
Now, this is how the dominoes fall. The alcoholic goes to the angry guys desk to ask for the file, but the angry guy is not there because he takes a smoke break at 6. So, the alcoholic looks for the file and happens upon the booze in the drawer. Being weak-willed, he steals it. Soon the angry guy comes to me saying that someone stole his booze and do I know anything about it? I tell him, truthfully, that I had sent the alcoholic to him to get that file. He gets real mad, sees the crowbar, takes it and goes on to beat the hell out of the alcoholic. Now, one of my competitors is in the hospital, the other in jail and I get the promotion.
Notice that nowhere along the line did I actually violate their free-will. At every step, they had the option of choosing otherwise than they did. Even if I had intervened in between - for example, if I saw the alcoholic going to the angry guy before 6 and waylaid him to make sure that he didn't get there them - I still haven't transgressed upon their free-will. All their choices were their own, according to their nature and desire.
