(July 21, 2013 at 7:54 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: If I understand it correctly, Hume's argument against miracles is essentially saying that people whom believe reports of miracles occuring are being inconsistent with their treatment of induction, yes? In other words, if you treat your induction that reports that person X is usually truth-telling as taking precedence over the your experience that, say, statues don't cry, you're being inconsistent.
Assuming I'm roughly right about Hume's argument, does it succeed? I've heard religious apologists say that the argument has long since been refuted (I know Swinburne's written on it, but I haven't read any of his works), but I myself don't have enough knowledge of philosophy to be aware of this apparent fact.
No, Hume's argument stands up pretty well. Essentially, he urged us to judge miracles or reports of miracles by asking: 'Which is more likely: That the miracle in question occured as reported, or that the report of said miracle is either mistaken or dishonest?'
By being parsimonious in our judgement, Hume would have us reject the report of a miracle if and only if the error or dishonestly of the reporter would be MORE miraculous that the event reported, and that strikes me as a pretty conclusive argument.
Suppose, for example, that I told you that long-dead Irish freedom-fighter Michael Collins has risen from the dead and is at this very moment living in my guest house, drinking tea and watching the rugby test on the telly. Such a state of affairs would certainly qualify as a miracle, but since it is less likely that Collins is alive than it is that I'm either a raving loony or a liar, you can safely reject my report.
Boru
‘I can’t be having with this.’ - Esmeralda Weatherwax
