(August 4, 2013 at 9:34 am)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: "[1] - Libertarian definition - Free will exists if your will is ultimately undetermined."
Okay so you really don't understand. I guess you've never heard of hard incompatabilism or so-called 'pessimism' on the matter.
Actually, its your own interpretation of Libertarian free-will that I'm pointing to. So, if there is anyone who doesn't understand, it'd be you.
(August 4, 2013 at 9:34 am)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: Furthermore I am creating no false dichotomy when I assume you are either talking about compatabilism or incompatabilism. It's a perfectly true dichotomy, of course, since either your definition is compatable with it or not.
Wrong. My definition's compatibility or incompatibility with determinism cannot be established without specifying a definition for determinism as well. Something I have not done.
Its the same as considering how my definition of free-will relates to "fogerty". Since I haven't defined what fogerty means or how it'd affect free-will, it makes no sense in saying that my position on free-will is compatible/incompatible with fogerty.
(August 4, 2013 at 9:34 am)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: This is a waste of time. I said I would reply once because I have tirelessly been through this so many times on the forums without a satisfactory counter-answer and so I'm pretty secure on the matter anyway, I just thought I'd have one more pop at it.
It was a mistake for me to not keep my word. It just seems kind of rude of me to just hit and run post. But sorry I can't continue this because to suggest that libertarian free will is proven if we are ultimately undetermined is incorrect. That would suggest that undetermined random chance would be free will.
And that's a contradiction anyway since the whole point of the "will" is willpower, it is used to literally will us... and we're not willing anything if we are random like dice. Or even if we are "reasonably probabilistic". If it's down to chance, probability or determinism there is not libertarian free will.
Libertarian free will is the idea that we could somehow ultimately will things (which is to determine them) without determinism (which contradicts the ability for us to determine things). It's a pro-free will incompatabilism. The alternative to that is not only hard determinism or compatible "soft" determinism, there is also hard incompatabilism or "pessimism", which is what I subscribe to, as did the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer and Albert Einstein.
Its difficult to find a satisfactory "counter-answer" if your own view remains poorly defined. If you keep conflating contradictory metaphysical positions and switching between definitions then it becomes quite simple to argue that the concept becomes nonsensical and logically impossible.
Libertarian free-will simply refers to an incompatibilist position wherein a person's actions could have been otherwise. This definition takes different meanings and implications under different ontological assumptions.
One such assumption is mind-body dualism. You assume your "mind" or "self" or "will" to be something removed from physical causality. Within this context, the meaning of libertarian free-will would be that the will is ultimately self-determined - this being the only interpretation you consider. The very idea of the will being "self-determined" makes sense if and only if you consider it an entity unto itself. The idea that free-will requires "ultimate self-determination" makes sense if and only if you regard "self" as an irreducible primary. However, your own ontological position seems to be to reject mind-body dualism and argue that irrespective of determinism or chaos, free-will cannot exist. That would be the fallacy of stolen concept - you reject the basis of the interpretation and then choose that particular interpretation to argue against.
Assuming your physicalist ontological position on mind, the interpretation of libertarian free will would rely on physical indeterminism. Here, "actions could've been otherwise" would mean that if physical indeterminism is true and your actions are not fully determined by prior events then you have free-will. Within this context, the very idea of "ultimate self-determination" is ridiculous because the "self" is not regarded as an irreducible entity.
