Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[genkaus]

You objected to mine though. Your objection is a question of what you think.

What I think about the Libertarian view of free-will. Not what I think about free-will myself. Important distinction.

Where did I say that? And why should I care what "seems to you".

You implied it with every statement of your previous post - thus my use of the word "seem".

And that is where Libertarianism loses to the arguments of hard incompatabilism.

Take it up with the Libertarians.

EDIT: Plus, the idea that Libertarianism is merely the view that free will is the absence of determinism and that chance alone is free will is only one version of Libertarianism. Some libertarians believe that ordinary chance is enough for the will to be "free" (even though randomness has zero effect on ultimate responsibility of actions for human beings, which is why many people are so interested in the free will debate in the first place) but many don't. Many believe that mere randomness is just as unfree as determinism (and of course it is, either way we have no more ultimate responsibility of action), and yet we still somehow have "free will".

You know why the free will debate is important in the first place... right?

You seem to have understood a part of it - here's the rest.

Lack of determinism is simply the defining feature of libertarian view of free-will. Inclusion of chance or randomness is not. Lack of determinism is the most comprehensive aspect that applies to all versions of libertarianism. For the purpose of this discussion, I'll elaborate on how this aspect plays out in two of those versions based on separate ontological positions.

The first is substance dualism - where mind and the physical world are considered as two separate, distinct and independent aspects of reality. Here, it is assumed that the mental aspect is not dependent on physical determinism or indeterminism - it is capable of self-determination. And within this context, the definition of free-will becomes "freedom from determinism and ultimate self-determination". This is how you personally view free-will but this definition can apply only if substance dualism is accepted. If you reject substance dualism - and I think you do - then you shouldn't consider this definition of free-will because it makes no sense without it.

The second version is physical monism - where mind and will are emergent properties, ultimately reducible to the physical components. The concept of ultimate self-determination makes no sense within this context. Which is why, the libertarian view of free-will in this case is freedom from determinism and dependence on indeterminism. Why do those libertarian subscribe to that idea of free-will, is something you need to ask them. However, since the very idea of "ultimate self-determination" is ridiculous within this context, choosing that definition of free-will would be begging the question.

Finally, we consider the question of free-will to be significant for determination of moral responsibility - but I'm not sure about that. The same way that the meaning of the phrase "free-will" changes with different ontological premises, so does the meaning of morality.

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I just want to inject my feelings here about some of the word games academics play. In particular, the "free will" found in compatibilism should never have been accepted as even a viable definition. Words mean what they fucking mean, and redefining them to mean something different does NOT solve the problem-- it constitutes a refusal to accept that one can't solve it.

So: "Free will is the freedom to act." No. Will is the intentional stance of a sentient being, who will RESIST stimulus based on internal ideals, and impose those ideals on the physical world. It necessarily implies that the will cannot be found in a physical monism.

Here's where you get it wrong - words don't just mean what they fucking mean; their meaning changes with context. And changing meaning with changing context is not the same as redefinition.

All the phrase free-will means - all that it can mean without any specified context - is that your will is has an element of freedom to it. That it is free from certain constraints and what those constraints might be is up to the context considered. Which is why if the compatibilists can justify their definition, then it is viable.

Further, even within physical monism, will can be found - such as in reductive physicalism, anomalous monism or functionalism.