(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: Historically, there are three kinds of non-freedom that I can think of: 1) fate (which implies acceptance of a mythology); 2) physical (or at least causal) determinism; 3) God/gods, specifically a Jewish God who allows free will, and which represent from the human perspective a (partly, at least) random influence.
In order to make the God argument, we have to prove God; that's a non-starter for me (even though it's kind of the OP). Fate also implies acceptance of unseen beings-- historically the Fate sisters.
So we're left with the idea of causal determinism. If the will is free, it is free from causal determinism.
That would be arguing from ignorance and begging the question. You can only think of 3 forms of non-freedoms, reject two and then conclude that the third is the only possible non-freedom your will could be free from. Here are a few more forms of non-freedoms:
- Biological non-freedom - your will needs to be free from your basic biological needs and instincts.
- Societal non-freedom - your will needs to be free from society's will.
- Conditioning non-freedom - your will should not be determined by what happened in your developmental or formative years.
- Circumstancial non-freedom - your will should not be constrained by your circumstances.
I can choose any of the above and any combination thereof and define that free-will exists if it is free from those constraints.
Before trying to think of non-freedoms - try and understand what "freedom" means. We take it to mean "the quality of being unconstrained" - but what it actually means is "the quality of being unconstrained by anything other than its own nature". Every object is constrained by itself, by its nature and by its existence. Thinking that 'total' freedom requires it to be free from itself is a logical impossibility and if that's the freedom you are looking for, then the whole idea of freedom is superfluous. Which is why regarding causal determinism as a "non-freedom" is incorrect. Every object, by its nature and irrespective of truth of free-will or substance dualism, is a part of causality. Regarding it as non-freedom means requiring the object to be free form itself - which is a nonsensical notion.
(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: And since physical monists (at least here) assert that such a monism is wholly deterministic, then free will implies dualism.
Wrong. Physical monists do not assert any such thing. Indeterminism is a form of physical monism.
(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: As for the idea that free will is an experience of part of brain function-- no. Will is an agency for motivated action, and no experience can be called that. If that is reality, then the reality is that there is no will, not that the will is compatible with brain function determinism.
No one describes free-will as "experience of a part of brain function". They describe it as one of the brain functions. And that is the explanation of will according to functionalism.
(August 7, 2013 at 3:51 am)bennyboy Wrote: So there is really only one context in which free will can sensibly considered: mind/matter dualism. If such dualism is false, there is no will to prove or disprove, or to investigate.
Incorrect - for all the reasons given above.
