Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[bennyboy]

Did you miss the point here or did you forget your own argument?

You chose causal determinism as a "non-freedom" from which one's will should be free. You didn't explain why it must be considered as a whole or why it is the only choice.

Similarly, I can choose a set of restraints some partially reducible to causal determinism but not reducible to whole of it and regard them as the 'non-freedom' the will should be free from.

I think you're moving goalpoasts. I started by talking about free will vs. determinism because that's the way the debate is normally framed. You challenged me on that in much the same way you are now, so I mentioned the other categories of freedom around which the debate has traditionally been framed: fate and religion (specifically Christian). Then you went on to give examples that fall under the three categories I'd already given.

Do I really have to consider ever possibly sub-category of freedom? How about freedom from tight drawers? Freedom from Pink Unicorns? Freedom from future-peering Space Monkeys? quote]
I can choose any of the above and any combination thereof and define that free-will exists if it is free from those constraints.[/quote]
Yes, in the historical context this works. Being free from the Fates or from God's predetermination allows for moral judgment, even if it is a determinist "freedom," emphasis on the quotes. You can see philosophers today, like Dennett and Harris, arguing over this.

You did forget your own argument. I didn't cover the "will" part because you didn't bring it up in the argument. The freedoms mentioned above are the ones associated with "will". Your broad generalization is incorrect because philosophers don't stick to those specific kinds of freedom.

Okay, so we're all talking about will, then? Fine. What is it? It would be funny if I hadn't brought it up, since I've defined it in this very thread. Define "bringing up." lol

Or do you just mean that I failed to bring it up in my attempt to explain specifically to you why I chose causal determinism as the "thing from which will must be free" ?

1) They do, too.

Who are they?

Philosophers 'n' sich. Basically, anyone who thinks that behavior is deterministic, but is aware that people say they feel like free agents.

Then that would be your problem. Your failure to grasp the change in the meaning of the word due to differing ontological presumptions is not an issue for the philosophers.

Hmmmm. . . it is if they want "will" to mean what it has meant for thousands of years, thereby engaging in meaningful debate with anyone who wants will to mean "will."

Consider the trivial "proof" given for substance dualism. It goes something like this. What do you mean by "I" or "me" or "self"? How is it defined? Its not my body parts, my arms, my legs my eyes etc. Its not my name or my behavior. Its not my brain. Its not any part of my brain which can be found by cutting it up into pieces. I'm not referring to any of these things when I talk about "I". So, I must be a spiritual entity. I am a soul in a spiritual plane and my body and brain are the means of my interaction with the physical world where "I" am nowhere to be found.

I now know that you've studied Buddhism. Did you do it willfully? Or did your circumstances force you to?

This definition of "self" has been used by substance dualists for centuries. So, any time you try to use this concept within physical monism, it would lose what you might consider a salient aspect - its spiritual nature. Are you arguing that physical monists should not use the word "I" or "me" or "self" - rather accept that within their ontological context, the self cannot exist?

Absolutely. Making references to the mind in physical monism is not to talk about physical monism.

That would be ridiculous. The spiritual aspect of self is a salient feature only within the dualist context. The actual meaning of the word would be the individual's identity as perceived by his consciousness. Those words would take on a completely different meaning within the monist context and yes, some of the salient features gained within the dualist context would be missing here. That does not mean that the words cannot or should not be used within that context.

Stop talking about spirit. Next, you'll be dancing around wiggling your fingers, saying "Ooh, look at me. I'm a dualist and I believe in magic."

Coming to the question of "will" - it is defined as "the mental faculty by which one chooses a course of action".

Of the terse one-line definitions findable on the internet, I think you've deliberatley chosen the one which is most compatible with physical determinism. You are missing the most important parts of will-- volition and sentience. In short, you're doing just what I accused physical monists of doing-- skewing the traditional meaning to make it more compatible with your worldview.

In and of itself, it has no dualist or monist connotations.

Because you're using a definition that is reducible either to dualism or to "mind is brain," since I already know you're about to go to "mind is brain."

Your will is an attribute of your mind - that is its salient, defining feature. Within the monist context, the mind is a emergent attribute of how the brain functions - and will becomes one of those functions. It is as simple as "Entity A feels hungry. Entity A sees food. Entity A eats food." Here, the will of entity A - the will to eat food - is the result of the interplay between external and internal stimuli. It does not matter if you can reduce the entity A and the set of events to a series of biochemical reactions. Existence of will and its functions take place at the level of a person's identity - not at chemical levels.

See, you're already using dualistic language. Entity A "feels" hungry. Really? How do you know that it feels? Do you probe it with your "Experience-o-meter 2000"? No. What you actually see is Entity A flopping around as it approaches food, and you are assuming that it is more than a food-approaching mechanism. And this is the problem with the emergence argument: mind is an emergent property which is inaccessible to anyone but the mind itself. This is unlike red light, which doesn't exist at the subatomic level, but can be measured or perceived by anyone.

Now, if only there was a word for things which cannot be measured, touched, or otherwise interacted with using any physical mechanism. Oh wait, there is-- non-physical. So if you want to reduce "will" down to a "faculty of mind" in a physical monism, then I'm going to want you to show me a mind, so I can examine it and decide for myself if it has a will at all, let alone a free one. Because as a diligent physical monist myself, if you can't show me one, or prove that it exists, then I'm going to discard it as a fiction-- and "will" along with it.