Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[genkaus]

Dear Genakus, my first post was an objection to the idea that libertarian free will is possible.

Your objection to my objection was that that was merely my own interpretation of things.

That should be obvious though, I can only interpret things my way, or I wouldn't be me.

No, my objection to your objection is that your interpretation is incorrect you are conflating two different ideas regarding free-will. The definition you keep criticizing is based on substance dualism while your criticisms are based on monism. Either you should criticize dualist definition of free-will (ultimate self-responsibility) with criticism assuming dualism or you should criticize monist definition (indeterminism) using arguments based on monism. Using monist arguments against the dualist definition is nonsensical.

I am merely trying to deal with what I consider to be the real issue of free will - the idea that we can somehow have ultimate responsibility of action and ultimate moral responsibility therefore, without determinism. With chance you don't get that. So that interpretation, in my opinion, is a petty and futile interpretation and a waste of time. Many many people really do believe in this world that people, ultimately, when it really comes down to it, have responsibility of action and therefore ultimate responsibility of their own moral action too. This is incorrect.

That is the real issue. I am not interested in what I consider to be your futility and pettiness.

Once again you are displaying your close-mindedness by claiming to have identified the 'real issue' of free will. The idea of moral responsibility and ultimate moral responsibility are not the same thing. While free will is relevant to the question of moral responsibility - ultimate moral responsibility is not a factor to be considered.

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I think you're moving goalpoasts. I started by talking about free will vs. determinism because that's the way the debate is normally framed. You challenged me on that in much the same way you are now, so I mentioned the other categories of freedom around which the debate has traditionally been framed: fate and religion (specifically Christian). Then you went on to give examples that fall under the three categories I'd already given.

I don't need to move the goalposts since you haven't shown what you set out to prove. You started talking about free-will vs determinism with the assumption that free-will, by definition, is incompatible with determinism (being defined as freedom from determinism) and any compatibilism would require redefinition of an established concept, which is unacceptable.

My counter to that is "freedom from determinism" is not the accepted definition of free-will. The accepted definition is "freedom from X" where X can refer to a particular concept within their philosophy which can be determinism as a whole, a part of determinism or bear no relation to determinism whatsoever.

You seemed to accept this and list 3 things you thought X could refer to and proceeded to reject two of them.

My counter was to list a few other things X could refer to - things that X has been traditionally referred to - which do not fall under the given categories.

Simply put, the free-will vs determinism debate arises only within the context of a particular definition of free-will within specific philosophies. Stating that theirs is the true and correct definition and accusing other philosophies of redefining the concept is invalid because their definition hasn't been universally accepted in the first place.

Do I really have to consider ever possibly sub-category of freedom? How about freedom from tight drawers? Freedom from Pink Unicorns? Freedom from future-peering Space Monkeys?

If you wish to prove that yours is the only possible 'correct' definition - then yes, you do.

Yes, in the historical context this works. Being free from the Fates or from God's predetermination allows for moral judgment, even if it is a determinist "freedom," emphasis on the quotes. You can see philosophers today, like Dennett and Harris, arguing over this.

So, we've established that free-will, by definition, does not mean freedom from determinism.

Okay, so we're all talking about will, then? Fine. What is it? It would be funny if I hadn't brought it up, since I've defined it in this very thread. Define "bringing up." lol

Or do you just mean that I failed to bring it up in my attempt to explain specifically to you why I chose causal determinism as the "thing from which will must be free" ?

The latter. This part of the debate was about you justifying the selection of "causal determinism" as the constraint.

Philosophers 'n' sich. Basically, anyone who thinks that behavior is deterministic, but is aware that people say they feel like free agents.

I'm sure their position gets frequently criticized.

Hmmmm. . . it is if they want "will" to mean what it has meant for thousands of years, thereby engaging in meaningful debate with anyone who wants will to mean "will."

Do you understand how a word can mean the same thing while providing completely different implications given the context?

I now know that you've studied Buddhism. Did you do it willfully? Or did your circumstances force you to?

I haven't studied Buddhism.

Absolutely. Making references to the mind in physical monism is not to talk about physical monism.

You are demonstrably wrong:

[url]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind#Monist_solutions_to_the_mind.E2.80.93body_problem

[/url]

Stop talking about spirit. Next, you'll be dancing around wiggling your fingers, saying "Ooh, look at me. I'm a dualist and I believe in magic."

That's a rather ignorant view of dualism.

[quote='bennyboy' pid='489576' dateline='1375909696']Of the terse one-line definitions findable on the internet, I think you've deliberatley chosen the one which is most compatible with physical determinism. You are missing the most important parts of will-- volition and sentience. In short, you're doing just what I accused physical monists of doing-- skewing the traditional meaning to make it more compatible with your worldview.

Actually, I chose the first one I found. I didn't choose it based on how compatible it is with determinism and I find it to be the most comprehensive definition available - one that applies equally to all philosophical positions without favoring one over the other. And if you actually see the definition, you should realize that sentience is implied by the phrase "mental faculty" and volition is a synonym. In conclusion, this is the traditional meaning of "will".

Because you're using a definition that is reducible either to dualism or to "mind is brain," since I already know you're about to go to "mind is brain."

"Mind is brain" happens to be a physical monist position. So, what you are saying is simply that this definition applies to different philosophies. Which isn't a problem.

See, you're already using dualistic language. Entity A "feels" hungry. Really? How do you know that it feels? Do you probe it with your "Experience-o-meter 2000"? No. What you actually see is Entity A flopping around as it approaches food, and you are assuming that it is more than a food-approaching mechanism. And this is the problem with the emergence argument: mind is an emergent property which is inaccessible to anyone but the mind itself. This is unlike red light, which doesn't exist at the subatomic level, but can be measured or perceived by anyone.

Now, if only there was a word for things which cannot be measured, touched, or otherwise interacted with using any physical mechanism. Oh wait, there is-- non-physical. So if you want to reduce "will" down to a "faculty of mind" in a physical monism, then I'm going to want you to show me a mind, so I can examine it and decide for myself if it has a will at all, let alone a free one. Because as a diligent physical monist myself, if you can't show me one, or prove that it exists, then I'm going to discard it as a fiction-- and "will" along with it.

You seem to have been reduced to incoherent babbling. Perhaps you should read up on the different monist positions regarding "mind" and "will" which should clear up a lot of ignorant statements here.

First of all, you can't use dualist language while talking about Monism.
Second of all, within monism, mind is measurable and observable even though our current technology is not at the level of doing so fully. Study up on it and come back once you have actually understood the position.