Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[bennyboy]

Here's from the wiki:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism), physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure, or structural constraints), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions).

General enough for you?

Okay. Now read the next paragraph in that wiki, which talks about the historical point of debate, and compare that with what I said about the history of this debate. Then look at the chart immediately to the right of what you quoted. Look familiar? (remember to comment on that page that they forgot to include "weak emergentism" and all the other very important considerations when making it)

Good luck convincing monists to accept your argument.

I don't need to. There are things, and minds which perceive them. There's my mind, and the stuff I'm staring at outside the window. One is "me," one seems to be external to me. If they want me to accept that the subjective and objective sides of that perceptual relationship are reducible to a monism, they can go for it.

In this discussion, you are criticizing the monist position as invalid without actually understanding what the monist position is. You are outlining your argument using your own definitions (which, btw, is your primary argument against the monist position), without any regard for how those definitions apply to the monist positions.

Go here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_...dy_problem. Figure out what the monist position actually is and then evaluate which criticisms apply to it.

Again, if there is a particular monist model which you want to argue for, go for it. I'm happy enough arguing against physical monism in generial: not so much as a contendor for reality, but as a proven (or even provable) champion. I can say though after paging through the main points that I would disagree with some of these theorists that their positions are monist at all, and with others that what they mean by "mind" is really what everyone else who has a mind means by that word.

That's what I've been trying to tell you. According to the monist position, you can prove that this active, speaking brain/body is experiencing something. There are quite specific explanations for things like "awareness", "experience" or "consciousness" within the monist position. Explanations which are available for you to study and evaluate. Refusing to do so while criticizing the strawman of that position does no-one any favors.

I'm not going to study the whole field of current neurology and models of mind to engage in a forum debate. If you think you have one worth examining, then bring it forth; a wave of a hand and a list of 20 models that you want me to independently study isn't necessary, since I'm prepared to argue any physical monist position with a simple challenge: prove that any physical system is ACTUALLY aware in the way that I am (i.e. it doesn't just act as though it is aware), and do so without an operational definition that begs the question. I don't believe it has been done, or can be.

I'll make you a deal-- you link or quote anything you think I need to address, and I'll promise to read it on one condition: I get to quote the same amount of material to you, and you have to promise to read it just as diligently. But again-- I think we should move this argument to a mind/matter thread.