Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[bennyboy]

Do you believe that the subjective side is not reducible to monism?

Personally, if I had the job of choosing only a monism, I'd go with some kind of idealism. I already know that I can perceive objects with only my mind, in the form of dreams, and I can conceive of a great mind which also contains the rules of physics.

But you should stop saying monism. My position is that a PHYSICAL monism is incompatible with any sensible definition of mind, or of free will.

I'm not arguing for a particular monist model, I'm arguing against your apparent understanding of monism. Specifically, your position that concepts such as mind or will are not valid concepts within monism.

PHYSICAL monism. I'm starting to feel suspicious that you're trying to set me up with a strawman.

You are not required to study the whole fields of neurology and the model of mind - simply the part where they explain what they mean by "mind" or "will" or "self". And if you have any relevant information about why none of those meanings are valid then I'd be happy to consider those links from you.

So, go ahead. Show me that you understand what monist worldviews mean when they say "mind" or "will" and prove to me - using external links, if you must - why those definitions are invalid and/or nonsensical.

Get real. There are thousands of models of the mind, and there may be as many definitions of will. This was originally your point, I believe.

I'm saying I believe I can reduce ALL physical monisms down to a simple test: I want you to produce ONE (1) example of a physical monism which both:
1) can prove that any physical system ACTUALLY experiences, as I do when I open my eyes in the morning
2) doesn't define mind in operational terms that beg the quesiton

If (1) fails, the theory is insufficient; if (2) fails, then nothing has been learned except that the redefiner wants to avoid the philosophical issues of dualism.

I believe all physical monist positions will fail both tests. But I'm not going to play the shell game where I refute one physical monist idea, and you say, "Yeah but what about the other 99, and others you don't know about, and that maybe haven't been invented yet?" Unless you have a model that passes my test, then none of the definitions used in those models is acceptable.