Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[bennyboy]

The reason why your test itself is invalid is as follows:

Your first requirement is that the monist position should prove that any physical system actually experiences the way you do when you wake up in the morning. However, the basic premise of physical monism is that everything is a physical system - including you, me and the rest of the humanity. Which means, you yourself are the example of a physical system that experiences the way you do. Which is why this argument is
a non-starter. The only way to counter this argument is by the assumption that "you" are more than a physical system. Which is basically disagreeing with premise of physical monism, i.e. assuming that "not everything is a physical system" and using that assumption to "disprove" physical monism.

When you start positing that properties which cannot be mutually observed or directly measured are "physical," then you've just redefined the word "physical." But if you're allowing this redefinition, you could also expand it to include God, fairies, the invisible pinkness of IPU and every OTHER entity or property which cannot be mutually observed or directly measured.

Similarly, your second criteria assumes that the dualist definition of mind or free-will is the "correct" definition and therefore, any operational definition of mind is equivalent to begging the question. But, this assumption is incorrect, which you'd realize if you actually took time to study the different views on the philosophy of mind. The most comprehensive and generic definitions of "mind" or "will" are philosophically neutral - they do not imply or favor a particular worldview such as dualism or monism. They are as applicable within monist context as they are within dualist one, though with quite different implications. However, the change in implications does not mean that the particular monist philosopher is redefining the word to avoid philosophical issues. And this is something you'd realize if you actually tried to understand how the word is used within different physicalist viewpoints.

The "correct" definition of mind is "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas" or something like that; it's a label for sentience. Now, you could define mind as brain function, but then what word will we use for "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas?" Let's say we call it "boobledyboo." You and I both know what will happen next: you will say, "boobledyboo is just brain function, and you can't prove otherwise!" But this ignores what most people really care about when they distinguish mind from body: whatever theory or world view you want to talk about, I do in fact wake up and become aware of my mind. And this mind is subjective, and is not objective; forcing it to take an objective meaning is goofy. The existence of the subjective stance is a brute fact, and cannot be defined away, not because of any particular position, but because we need a word to use as a label for that particular brute fact.

So let me ask you this: what are the criteria by which you (or ANY of the models, views or theories you keep telling me I'm ignorant of, but refuse to introduce into the discussion) determine something is "physical?" Let me guess: "Physical means any material, energy, or property which exists," right?