Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[genkaus]

When you start positing that properties which cannot be mutually observed or directly measured are "physical," then you've just redefined the word "physical." But if you're allowing this redefinition, you could also expand it to include God, fairies, the invisible pinkness of IPU and every OTHER entity or property which cannot be mutually observed or directly measured.

Firstly, mutual observation and direct measurement are not and have never been the criteria for determining if something is physical - actual observation and actual measurement are. The difference is as follows: I may observe something instantaneous - such as a particular arrangement of clouds - that may not be observed by anyone else or repeated again. That does not make it non-physical. Similarly, in group hallucinations, people may claim to see the same thing, but that does not make it physical because it is not an actual observation. And not everything that is physical can be directly measured - we use indirect methods of measurement all the time in all sorts of cases.

Secondly, it is incorrect to assume that mental phenomena are not mutually observable or directly measurable. In this case, the apparatus for observation and measurement - our brain and nervous system - happens to be the same as the object being observed and measured. And since we typically cannot share the apparatus with someone else, it makes the process of someone else observing or measuring a tad difficult. But not impossible. For example, in case of conjoined twins where two individuals do share a potion of the apparatus, mental phenomena concerning the shared potion is mutually observable and directly measurable by both. This fact is more evident in case of Craniopagus twins where the shared apparatus is a portion of the brain.

The "correct" definition of mind is "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas" or something like that; it's a label for sentience.

No, it isn't. If you are going to argue definitions, then you should atleast consult a dictionary beforehand. The correct definition is:

The set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory.
or
the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges, etc.
or
The human consciousness that originates in the brain and is manifested especially in thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination.
or
the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons

And no, it is not a label for sentience.

Now, you could define mind as brain function,

No, I'd define it as in one of the ways given above - none of which match your "correct" definition.

but then what word will we use for "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas?"

Sentience. The word you are looking for is "sentience".

In the philosophy of consciousness, sentience can refer to the ability of any entity to have subjective perceptual experiences, or as some philosophers refer to them, "qualia". This is distinct from other aspects of the mind and consciousness, such as creativity, intelligence, sapience, self-awareness, and intentionality (the ability to have thoughts that mean something or are "about" something). Sentience is a minimalistic way of defining consciousness, which is otherwise commonly used to collectively describe sentience plus other characteristics of the mind.

Clearly, this refers to something different than the mind.

Let's say we call it "boobledyboo." You and I both know what will happen next: you will say, "boobledyboo is just brain function, and you can't prove otherwise!"

Or perhaps I'll say (and by 'I', I mean the physical monist philosopher I'm arguing for) -

"For the given physical monist theory X, sentience - the element of subjectivity associated with the mind - remains the biggest stumbling block that keeps it from being a comprehensive explanation for the existence of "mind". However, given that a lot of other aspects of mind are explained by X and the alternate explanations for sentience lack any evidence for it, X remains the best explanation for the mental phenomena, thus making the assumption that sentience is just another brain function a default position."

But this ignores what most people really care about when they distinguish mind from body: whatever theory or world view you want to talk about, I do in fact wake up and become aware of my mind.

The counter-argument should be really obvious here. The facts are not determined by what people care about. If the evidence suggests - as the physical monists insist it does - that mind is nothing more than specific manner of brain function, then what people care about or what your subjective awareness suggests does not matter.

And this mind is subjective, and is not objective; forcing it to take an objective meaning is goofy. The existence of the subjective stance is a brute fact, and cannot be defined away, not because of any particular position, but because we need a word to use as a label for that particular brute fact.

Do you realize that you are making absolutely no sense here? "Subjective" means based on the mind; existing in mind; or proceeding from mind. Objective means independent of the mind. Talking about subjective or objective while attempting to define the mind is nonsensical. Your "subjective stance" here is not a brute fact, its a tautology - trivially true and essentially meaningless.

So let me ask you this: what are the criteria by which you (or ANY of the models, views or theories you keep telling me I'm ignorant of, but refuse to introduce into the discussion) determine something is "physical?" Let me guess: "Physical means any material, energy, or property which exists," right?

"Determine" if something is physical - I'd say if it can be conceptually reduced to or be explained by its physical constituents.