Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[bennyboy]

not everything that is physical can be directly measured - we use indirect methods of measurement all the time in all sorts of cases.

Fine. Show me the "actual" measurement of consciousness. I'll wager you're going to show me an fMRI readout.

The "correct" definition of mind is "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas" or something like that; it's a label for sentience.

No, it isn't. If you are going to argue definitions, then you should atleast consult a dictionary beforehand. The correct definition is:

The set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory.
or
the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges, etc.
or
The human consciousness that originates in the brain and is manifested especially in thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination.
or
the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons

And no, it is not a label for sentience.

Okay, you have some pretty varied definitions there. The "brain" definition is an obvious question-beggar, and is out. Now, when I talk about "feeling," I'm talking about an experience. I already know that you're going to wiki feeling and give a definition that does not describe it adequately in my view, like: "the neurological response of an organism's brain to stimulus."

but then what word will we use for "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas?"

Sentience. The word you are looking for is "sentience".

You are about to define sentience as an ability, rather than as any kind of content, so you might want to iron out that inconsistency. But my point is, WHATEVER word we use, even sentience, will eventually get distilled down to a physical-compatible definition, no matter how un-physical-compatible it started out in its initial intention.

In the philosophy of consciousness, sentience can refer to the ability of any entity to have subjective perceptual experiences, or as some philosophers refer to them, "qualia". This is distinct from other aspects of the mind and consciousness, such as creativity, intelligence, sapience, self-awareness, and intentionality (the ability to have thoughts that mean something or are "about" something). Sentience is a minimalistic way of defining consciousness, which is otherwise commonly used to collectively describe sentience plus other characteristics of the mind.

Clearly, this refers to something different than the mind.

Holy strawman, Batman!-- you have just insisted that I'm talking about sentience, and then you go on to show that sentience isn't mind, but a part of it. Nice trick if you can get away with it.

At any rate, whatever you want to call it, or whatever semantic quibble we can make about it, the fact is that there's something about what happens in a human being that separates it (at least we think so) from any other kind of data-processing: the ability to actually experience. In a conversation about free will, we are looking at the possibility that some quality of humanity (call it whatever you want) can affect how the universe unfolds through time. Defining everything in physical terms isn't debating-- it's a refusal to take the debate seriously, or (as you'll see at the end of this post) a refusal to debate.

Or perhaps I'll say (and by 'I', I mean the physical monist philosopher I'm arguing for) -

"For the given physical monist theory X, sentience - the element of subjectivity associated with the mind - remains the biggest stumbling block that keeps it from being a comprehensive explanation for the existence of "mind". However, given that a lot of other aspects of mind are explained by X and the alternate explanations for sentience lack any evidence for it, X remains the best explanation for the mental phenomena, thus making the assumption that sentience is just another brain function a default position."

Hang on, you're getting ahead of things here. I'm still waiting for you to show me a mind, or to prove it exists. You might as well be talking about how God is physical, or IPU.

But this ignores what most people really care about when they distinguish mind from body: whatever theory or world view you want to talk about, I do in fact wake up and become aware of my mind.

The counter-argument should be really obvious here. The facts are not determined by what people care about. If the evidence suggests - as the physical monists insist it does - that mind is nothing more than specific manner of brain function, then what people care about or what your subjective awareness suggests does not matter.

People care about their subjective experience, because it's a fact of high significance to them. And so they have a word to talk about that part of their experience which is not shareable with others except through intermediary symbolism-- the mind.

And this mind is subjective, and is not objective; forcing it to take an objective meaning is goofy. The existence of the subjective stance is a brute fact, and cannot be defined away, not because of any particular position, but because we need a word to use as a label for that particular brute fact.

Do you realize that you are making absolutely no sense here? "Subjective" means based on the mind; existing in mind; or proceeding from mind. Objective means independent of the mind. Talking about subjective or objective while attempting to define the mind is nonsensical. Your "subjective stance" here is not a brute fact, its a tautology - trivially true and essentially meaningless.

And yet, the mind is capable of examining itself, and of thinking about itself, without reference to the physical world outside it, and cannot be directly perceived by others. If you want to argue that my ideas about my own mind are objective, and not subjective, then good luck with that.

"Determine" if something is physical - I'd say if it can be conceptually reduced to or be explained by its physical constituents.

I'd add: it can be shown to exist.

_____

I don't think there's much point continuing with this, unless you want to begin a formal 1 vs. 1 debate; things are getting too squirmy now. The long and short of it is that I don't accept your definitions, or your rationale for choosing them: I think that they beg the question, and you think they are just adapted to different contexts. You don't accept my assertion that some words are intrinsically dualistic or idealistic, and that they must therefore be used in that context.

In the end, when a debate fails at the definition of terms, then that's pretty much all she wrote. We cannot agree on what free will is, and so we cannot carry on a sensible debate about whether it has anything to do with determinism or Divine Providence.

It's been fun trying, though.