Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[bennyboy]

That we can regard awareness as data processing does not mean all forms of data processing can be regarded as awareness. Its a pretty simple argument:

A. Awareness is a type of data processing (Cats are a type of mammals).
B. All data processing can be regarded as awareness (All mammals can be regarded as cats).

B here is clearly invalid.

Now you're starting to understand me.

A. I am capable of actual experience, and have a brain which functions in certain ways.
B. Everything with a brain which functions in certain ways is actually experiencing.

B here is clearly invalid.

So, while we have no reason to believe that awareness is anything more than processing data, the question remains exactly at what point would be consider a data-processing system to be aware? What is the definitive and verifiable feature of awareness that separates it from any other form of data processing?

Its not identification of patterns - since understanding is not a necessary element of awareness.

Its not the capacity for interaction - the response-stimulus model isn't a necessary element of awareness either.

Do we consider sensory input to be the defining feature? Sunflowers seem to be aware of the sun's position. Touch-me-not seems to be aware of physical contact.

Is it a matter of complexity? Do we consider micro-organisms to be aware? Or is there some specific feature of a biological system which leads to awareness?

The point is, though we've not yet figured out exactly what features of a data-processing system are required for it to be "aware", be capable of experience and have a mind, there is however no evidence to suggest that mind is something more than a data-processing system.

You just listed all the aspects of brain function which are considered defining features of awareness, and yet you're not willing to concede that any OTHER system which has those features is necessarily aware. This means that looking at brain function and finding the ability to identify, or to process, or to interect, or any level of complexity of these things is NOT sufficient to prove awareness.

Now, your fMRI isn't looking like the be-all end-all that it was a couple of posts ago.

Let me ask you this: if a computer simulation can take in visual and auditory input, process it, and output behavior to a cyborg body so that it passes the Turing test, would you believe that it was actually experiencing the universe?

Yes, I would. It may not be the same manner of experience as us, but it'd be experience nonetheless.

With this, I categorically disagree. First of all, you've just said that none of these abilities necessarily constitute awareness. You'll have to explain how it both CAN and also CANNOT.
Second, I define experience as my ability to really feel feelings, really see colors, not just for my brain to process them. I know this special ability exists, because I happen to have it. I assume people have it, because they behave much as I behave, and so I believe they are like me in other ways, as well.

This is a problem, because if you want to prove that awareness is a particular kind of data processing, you'll have to show that there is no fundamental awareness in rocks, or in the sun, or in every particle in the universe. Having evidence for a theory for which contrary evidence cannot, even hypothetically, be produced is not to have a workable theory-- it's a very good signal that question-begging is accompanying philosophical assumptions.

Okay, let's get super-inclusive, because that makes words better, right? Let's define "will" as the possibility that a collection of wave functions ("A") might do something, and let's define "freedom" as the absence of any other collection of wave functions ("B") that prevent A from doing it.

Goo. Now that we've established the generalized form, let's get to the specifics - what specific wave-functions does A refer to, what does doing 'something' mean, what does the other collection of wave-functions B refer to, etc.?

Any collection. A drop of water might land on my head; a gust of wind blows it off course; the drop therefore has no free will. My dog might go to his food bowl; he can see that my wife has not put food in the bowl; my dog therefore has no free will.

Now, we don't have to goof around with a bunch of arbitrary shorthand for properties that we can't independently verify even exist. Love: can't put it next to a ruler. Beauty: we know in our heart of hearts that it exists only in the brain, but can't even define it precisely. Free will: can't touch this.

Your mistake is to assume that they are arbitrary or that they can't be verified independently.

And again, we're down to operational definitions. Don't believe me? Define beauty, and say how it can be "verified independently."

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Okay, I think I'm confirmed that we're not going to make any progress here. I'm happy to argue about physical monism, idealism and substance dualism, but I really feel we should move to a different thread.