Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[genkaus]

Only if it thinks experience is the same as brain function, and if it has access to an fMRI. But it's not the fault of the "entity" if it is not capable of experiencing as I do.

Existence of so many conditions does imply your definition's inadequacy.

"Good" enough is just a euphemism for "compatible." And that's begging the question-- you make a definition in physical terms, and later, once the dust has settled and nobody realizes that an operational definition is different than the original, you say, "Look-- there's a picture of someone's mind-- right there on the computer screen." But you're not talking about their experience-- you're talking about blood flow in the brain.

That's where you are wrong - we are not making a definition in physical terms, we are making it in empirical terms. That is the point you consistently fail to get.

Well, if we are defining reality based on our ideas, rather than vice versa, then maybe we should talk about some kind of idealistic monism. Because I think if you strip away all the ideas in physical monism, you are left with a bunch of wave functions, and no objects which can have attributes like will or the ability to experience.

We are identifying reality based on our ideas - which in turn are based on reality - not defining it. Which is why talking about idealistic monism makes to sense.

As I said, I accept the theoretical possibility, but I challenge you to prove it. It must be assumed, just as I assume that the text ascribed to "genkaus" comes from a sentient human mind. This is a pragmatic assumption-- but it cannot be "shown to be true."

Sure. What's the criteria for the falsifiability of your hypothesis that "sentience cannot be shown to be true".

No, it doesn't actually have to be capable of experience. It just has to be able to process data AS THOUGH it were capable of experience. Because if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, we know for sure it feels like a duck-- right?

Wrong - that's the point I'm making. Without the actual capacity to feel experience it'd be impossible to completely mimic the results of experiential data processing.

We don't know. . . yet? I think what you meant to say is, "We don't know. . ." "Yet" is a predictive word, and I don't think you can demonstrate that the discovery of the elements you mentioned is guaranteed. . . or even possible.

Like I said, the current preponderance of evidence favors the physicalist interpretation of all mental functions, including sentience. Thus, the discovery of the elements I mentioned can be reasonably expected - though not guranteed - hence the use of the word "yet".

As I've already said, non-solipsism is a pragmatic assumption, not a provable fact. I accept this assumption, because interacting with people I consider "real" is more interesting to me, and feels more natural to me, than not doing so.

That's your problem: you don't say "we don't know yet, let's find out", your default position is "we can't know at all". Thankfully, the scientists don't share your view.

As for blindness-- let's change your example. How would you explain to a worm (if you could speak wormy) what it means to see? Or how could a bat explain to you what it feels like to use natural sonar?

Assuming that the worm or the bat is capable of that level of understanding - this is a question for you to ponder upon. I think about the issue quite frequently and have a few ideas about how to go about this - but any such discussion would be pointless if you keep arguing from the assumption that it can't be done.

Most importantly, what is the chance that ALL human beings have some shortcoming of which they are unaware, which makes their view on the reality of the universe so hopelessly skewed that they get it all wrong? Are we as clever, and as capable of objective observation, as we think we are? I'm going to say-- almost for sure not. And yet we insist on defining reality exactly by those limitations. I suppose a worm would say, "What's all this seeing business you keep going on about? Make me taste it, or it's not real."

I'd say, we are cleverer than you give us credit for - given that we are aware of the limits and shortcomings of our perceptual capacity and we have figured out ways to overcome them. Unlike your worm, we do not assume that it is not real if it is beyond the limits of our perceptual awareness, we say, if it is real, our perceptual limitations should not be a hindrance for us to perceive it.