(September 9, 2013 at 8:55 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Lately, I have revisited my beliefs about cause. I came across the idea of 'probabilistic cause' wherein cause is examined as probable rather than deterministic outcomes. Most of what I have read seems focuses on epistemology, but I think it has far reaching implications.
Relationships of efficient cause are known only by induction. These causal inferences do not qualify as certain knowledge in the way knowledge gained by deduction is. This uncertainty allows you to consider some, if not all, examples of efficient cause as correlations that vary in strength. For example, in other threads I acknowledge a strong correlation between brain functions and mental states, without accepting a deterministic cause-effect relationship.
As a metaphysical concept, probabalistic causation seems more in line with modern quantum physics, as compared to mechanistic 18th century physics. Based on macroscopic experience you tend to think in terms of solid objects moving smoothly through space. But you know that time-space is pixelated and particles pop in and out of existence from the quantum vacuum. Motion is occurs when a particle cease to exist in one location and randomly appears at another within a field of probability. Despite this new scientific knowledge, the most prominent contemporary philosophers seem not to have reexamined the foundations of their theories about motion and change.
For a long time I have strongly intuited that the Aristotelian causes (final, formal, efficient, and material) still had relevance. As a methodological convention of scientific inquiry, excluding formal and final causes has proven enormously successful. This convention clearly does not give a full picture of reality. Anyone can see this from the fact that mathematics produces knowledge with form as its only consideration, to the exclusion of efficient and material cause.
Probabalistic [efficient] cause presents an opportunity to reintroduce final and formal causes into our understanding of reality. Both allow you to account for mental properties generally dismissed or unexplained by the scientism of materialistic monism.
Today even committed skeptics acknowledge that some rigorously performed psi experiments produce statistically significant results. The thoughts from a 'sender' to a 'receiver' can increase the hit rate of the receivers from 25% to 32%. Apart from fraud, no purely materialistic theory can account for these results. You could say that the sender's intention to send and the receiver's intention to receive qualify as an example of final cause.
Meanwhile, formal cause finds a place by accounting for the character of the probability field that defines objects, by either promoting or thwarting the likelihood of physical events. This solves the mind-body interaction problem of dualism. Brain activity is a highly chaotic system. If mind can manipulate chance, in the same way psi experiments have shown, a very small 'push' at the quantum level (Penrose, etc.) would affect how the
physical body behaves. In this process, mental properties, including free will, are preserved.
As usual, nice effort, but no cigar.
I like your arguments here because they are grounded in decent scientific research and I had to do quite a bit of research in order to point out the errors. You start off well, but end up reaching for the desired conclusion rather than arriving at it logically.
The first problem I see is your understanding of probabilistic causation theories. Contrary to what you seem to conclude here - they are not, in fact, more or less valid within the context of modern quantum mechanics.
The earlier understanding of causation was that the statement "A causes B" means the occurrence of event A is necessarily followed by occurrence of event B. Under probabilistic theory the statement "A causes B" means that occurrence of event A raises the probability of occurrence of event B. This difference isn't about quantum mechanics vs Newtonian mechanics or determinism vs probability. The uncertainty here refers to the gap in our knowledge. For example, under normal circumstances, when we talk about efficient cause, a high level of probability makes any mention of it superfluous. I can say dropping the vase caused it to break without adding the qualifier of 99% of the time because of the high degree of certainty involved. But in absence of this certainty - like with smoking and lung cancer - the inclusion of probability becomes necessary.
The second problem with your argument is your view of how methodological naturalism relates to Aristotelian causes. Our usage of the terms has changed since his times. What he called material cause, we refer to as 'composition'. His 'formal cause' became structure, 'final cause' became function (or intention behind it - where necessary) and his 'efficient cause' became just 'cause'. Therefore, the probabilistic theory of causation refers exclusively to 'efficient causes' - not the rest. This does not mean that the other causes are no longer relevant or significant withing methodological naturalism - we just don't call them causes anymore. Which is why, unfortunately, appealing to probabilistic theory of causation is not the gap you are looking for to reintroduce those causes - because those causes haven't been excluded in the first place.
Now we come to the crux of your argument - which is about psionic experiments and their relation to mind-body dualism. Specifically, you are referring to the Ganzfeld experiment where your quoted increase of 25% to 32% makes sense.
The premise of the experiment seems to be as follows. The subject A is placed in a state of of sensory deprivation. Another subject B observes the targets and tries to send the information mentally to A. A keeps talking about what he sees during this time (recorded for reference) and afterwards is shown the same target that B saw - along with 3 decoys - to see if it matches. The expected 'hit-rate' is 25%. The resulting 'hit-rate' was 32%. And the difference is statistically significant.
However, even if we were to rule out fraud, it is still a reach to go from there to dualism. One criticism of the experiment is the psi-assumption. That is, the assumption that any significant statistical deviation is caused by actual existence of telepathy. While the deviation is significant, the question of what it signifies is not that simply answered.
But, even if it were established as telepathy, your argument that "no purely materialistic theory can account for these results" would still be incorrect.
My first hypothesis in absence of fraud would be subconscious perception, i.e. relying on perceptions before or after the ganzfeld effect to make the judgments. This would, ofcourse, depend upon the experimental setup.
The second hypothesis would limited sensory perception. That is, even during the experiment the subject A's senses cannot be fully elimination and they might be working at a level he isn't aware of.
My third explanation would be to a monistic explanation of telepathy. The sender's brain generates weak electro-magnetic fields and when the receiver is in a state of sensory deprivation, his brain syncs with those fields to an extent.
So, you see, the problem is, even if you were to establish the existence of telepathy, using that as evidence for dualism would still be reaching.
