Argument Against Divine Purpose

[genkaus]

So, one of the spurious claims made by theists is that because [they believe] God exists, they therefore have some kind of true, "objective" purpose while the atheist (nor anyone else) does not if their atheistic worldview is true.

I have some problems with this and I will offer what I think is a refutation of that idea, as well as show some problems with it if it were true.
Firstly, I'll run the following argument:

P1) For an agent to consider something its purpose, it makes a value judgement.

P1.1) In other words, something isn't considered a purpose unless it comforms to/entails something(s) that the agent values.

P2) If purpose is a value judgement, then an agent can choose what their purpose is provided at least some of their prior values cohere with said chosen purpose.

C) Since purpose is a value judgement, purpose can therefore be chosen by an agent.

The logic seems valid and the premise sound to me. You don't designate something to be your purpose unless something about what is being considered entails agreeing with at least some of your values. So for theists, serving God haa become their purpose because of some value, probably one or more of the following:

-Eternal life (minus torture)

-Being loved by the expression of Goodness itself (Christianity likes to pilfer Platonic concepts, as you can see)

-Recognizing when they are wrong and immoral, that is, acknowledging the Biblical concept of our sinful nature.

-Acknowledging that a higher being can imbue a lesser being with objective purpose


That last one in particular is of importance. If the theist makes the common claim that only by there being a supreme being can humans have objective purpose, then I can run this argument (taking into account the previous argument about purpose and value judgements):

P1) For a being to have an objective purpose (OP) for its existence, there must be a greater being whom imbues them with that OP.

P2) A being who has no objective purpose in existing is an existential nihilist (EN).

P3) A being who does not have OP cannot imbue themself or anyone else with OP.

P4) God is - by definition - the greatest being conceivable, and thus is not lesser than any being.

C) Therefore God has no OP and is an EN, and cannot imbue objective purpose on other beings.

The only possible theistic response I can imagine is that as the supreme being, God can in fact imbue himself with objective, cosmic purpose, but other beings cannot. Firstly, this is nonsensical. To imbue someone with objective purpose, one would have to be the originator of that being, yes theists? After all, that's how theists conclude that God imbues US with objective purpose. Since no being can (by definition) be greater than God, God has no purpose. And given that theists believe beings without objective purpose cannot imbue objective purpose on other beings, God cannot do so.


Also to note, the first argument is using 'purpose' to mean immediate purpose, not 'objective', externally-imbued purpose.

The thing about theists you should understand that they start with the assumption of god's existence and then proceed to reinterpret all concepts and definitions accordingly. Once you get that, all their nonsensical arguments start making so much sense.

For example, consider the word "objective". Normally, when you consult a dictionary as to its meaning, you'd find something like "determined by object, instead of the subject". But god is the one who determines everything and anything. So, if god is the subject considering an object, then nothing can be considered objective. So, what the definition "really" means is "determined by object instead of 'human' subject". And since everything that is not determined by humans is determined by god, then objective becomes synonymous with god-given.

Just try it out. When they say, "objective laws of logic or nature cannot exist without a god", what they mean is "god-given laws cannot exist without a god". Sam goes for objective moral values and here, objective purpose. The point here is not that you were imbued with a purpose from a being higher than you, the point is that you must be imbued with a purpose form god.

Consider presenting this argument to a theist:
My government is a being higher than me. My government has given me this purpose to spy on another country. So, I regard it as an objective purpose of my life to do so.

Do you think he'd accept this argument as evidence that one could have an objective purpose without god? I wouldn't bet on it.

Atheistic view from a theistic POV becomes pretty obvious as well: Atheists don't believe in god, so they don't believe in a god-given purpose. Which means they don't have an objective purpose in life.

Wait, here's another one: Atheists don't believe in god, so they must not believe in everything that god has created. And since god has created everything, then atheists must not believe in anything.



Which brings us to your arguments.

Regarding your given reasons as to why a theist would choose "god's purpose", the last one should read:
- Acknowledging that any purpose god imbues anyone with is, by definition, objective.

Given that, your argument fails at P1. God can imbue humans with a purpose and it would be an objective purpose. God can imbue angels with a purpose and it would be an objective purpose. And god can imbue himself with a purpose and it would be an objective purpose. On the other hand, if the imbuer happens to be anyone else, then it's not objective anymore.


The real fun begins when you point it out that they are, in-fact, equivocating between god-given and objective. Then they go onto a long-winded rant about god's nature and what he is and his consistency and so on and so forth.

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When the theist is talking about objective purpose, what they really mean is a purpose determined by an external source. It is a purpose bestowed upon a being that isn't dependent upon that being, so in that sense, no, an atheist cannot have that.

Are you sure about that? If that were the case, then getting a purpose from any external source would be sufficient - whether it be society, your family or your government. My guess is that when a theist talks about objective purpose, what they really mean is a purpose determined by an external source who is god.

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"P1) For a being to have an objective purpose (OP) for its existence, there must be a greater being whom imbues them with that OP."

I am never sure how to argue philosophy as I never studied it and that usually means I get the wrong end of the stick.

The above is the problem for me. Does it have to be a greater being that imbues them with OP?

Whilst I would not argue that my life lacked OP prior to the birth of my daughter it certainly gained a great deal of OP on her arrival.

She was not, at that time, a greater being than me, yet she gave me what I would regard as objective purpose - bringing her up as well as I possibly can.

I'm guessing this is not what you were looking for.

But - if my daughter can give me OP could we give God OP?

My guess is that the theist would respond that god gave you your daughter in order to give you that objective purpose - which means, even if your don't believe in him, he still cares about you.

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It appears that philosophically you need a minimum of efficient cause and material cause (sculptor an a block of marble for example). There can't be a single cause for something (sculptor with no marble or vice versa).

If that is that case what is the efficient cause in radioactive decay?

I'm guessing this is about TBS's arguments against Kalam's Ontological Argument.

The thing is, saying that "for anything to exist, you need a minimum of efficient cause and material cause" was not the point he was actually making. His arguments were specific to Kalam's propositions and the things cited as "evidence" - so yes, he did not lay out all the possible scenarios here.

Specifically, Kalam's argument was about everything having an efficient cause and the evidence was that we don't know of anything without an efficient cause. TBS's reply was to point out that in every known case of efficient cause, there has been a material cause as well - so the argument of efficient cause creating ex-nihilo is invalid.

But he never addressed the possibility of something existing only with material cause - or rather, without any external efficient cause. He also did not go into the possible nature of efficient causes (for example, both the sculptor and the act of sculpting can be cited as efficient causes) and he did not factor in the effect other causes might have - he didn't need to, that was beyond the scope of the argument. But presuming broader philosophical principles from what he did say would be a mistake.

Specific to your example, we can cite the instability of the nucleus as the efficient cause of the radio-active decay. The problem, however, is that the nucleus can be unstable fro a long time before it decays - so the instability is not a sufficient causal explanation. Which can mean one of two things, either the efficient cause is something we do not know yet or that we are seeing an event without efficient cause. The latter interpretation is often cited as evidence against the claim "everything that has a beginning has a cause".