Contra Metaphysical Idealism

[bennyboy]

I don't see what keeps your idealism from sliding headlong into solipsism. You assert that you can't know anything but the ideas in your mind. Where do you get the notion that anything is more than an idea in your mind and only your mind? There's no reason to stop at idealism, other than that, at some level, even you realize how absurd it is to dismiss the existence of an independent, shared reality.

Good point. When do you get off the philosophical train as it passes through solipsism, through experientialism and idealism, through spiritualism, and through physical monism?

Let's start with what I accept as self-evident. My experiences exist. Therefore, the first position I must consider is that of solipsism. However, if the universe is a projection only of myself, then I'm an ego in conflict, since many of my experiences cause me suffering. I'm not aware of any desire to inflict suffering on myself, so I believe that at least some experiences originate from outside myself.

Now onto a communal idealism. If I accept that other agents exist, and that they experience somewhat as I do, and we all agree that certain experiences of form and function are consistent, we come to the idea that these experiences represent a truth external to the human minds which conceive them. So if all is mind, there is a supermind, or a vast multiplicity of minds, which support the existence of the universe as we experience it.

Now onto physical monism. Since some shared experiences are considered external to the human minds which conceive them, then those must originate from an objective source, and must be self-dependent. Having already accepted the minds of others, via their behaviors and their incompatibility (in some cases) with the conscious wishes of my ego, as being existent, I can now treat them as also objective to myself-- properties of the bodies and brains I can perceive.

Now, however, we've closed the circle-- we've used experience to create a model of an objective reality, and used that model to infer the "real" nature of consciousness. But we have a couple of problems:
1) the existence of other minds was an assumption all along-- it was never (and could never) be established with any strong logical line
2) we've now done a loop and a half-- the physical inquiries we've made, founded on the assumption of a monistc physical universe, have lead to the falsification of the foundations of experience-- whatever reality is, we now know FOR SURE that we aren't experiencing it as such. And since our little train ride started with direct experience as the foundation upon which all those other assumptions and inferences are based, we're hooped.

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Why not? In a reality composed entirely of ideas, concepts, and experiences, why wouldn't they?

Because those things in the world move beyond merely things of which I am consciously aware of, which on the idealist view is all that exists.

This is not my interpretation of idealism. This is what I would call solipsism.

And it makes nonsensical the belief that anything happens that affects a person in a surprising way. Think about it: on an idealist view, why does touching a hot stove hurt, and consistently so, and only when the person in question has a properly functioning nervous system? Under an idealist worldview, there should be no such consistency since the only reason reality is as it is, is because of the way minds think of it.

In a non-solipsistic idealism, just because all is mind doesn't mean that I have access to, and control over, it all. That would be like saying if everything is physical, why can't I reach out and move the sun?

Why qualify "experience" with "physical"? It sounds like you're trying to piggyback one philosophical context onto another one.

Because the "experience" has certain features that are effectively inexplicable under a non-physicalist metaphysics.

I disagree. The nature of ideas is that there is no necessary limitation on their nature or content.

Well, there are several problems that come to light there. Firstly, then what you are really supporting is not metaphysical idealism per se, but something like an indirect metaphysical realism in which there is, unless I'm mistaken, an objective world apart from observation or minds, but which cannot actually be "seen" by minds as it is in itself, which is the position I hold.

This is why I declare as agnostic, and not as a metaphysical idealist. That being said, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a universe composed of ideas, in which most of those are obscure to us due to limitations of perspective.

Secondly, it's not even clear how that [subjectivity of consciousness] makes it absurd if viewed as nested within physicalism, unless you hold that the inverse is also absurd.

I think it's pretty clear. Ideas, by our experience, can be BOTH abstract or concrete, BOTH consistent or elusive in nature. Therefore, a collection of experiences which are concrete and consistent fit perfectly fine into a mind-only universe.

A physical monism, on the other hand, is defined by objective properties: things being locatable in time and space, for example. Neither concepts nor elementary particles can be positioned in this way. In order to make physical monism work, you have to stretch it so far that it is really just another name for idealism.

I think that's actually a fallacy of reification and a subtle argument from ignorance. You basically said something to the effect of: "Science shows that aspects of the world we experience is weird and random; under idealism it would make sense if the world was weird and random. Therefore science supports idealism."

Given ignorance, it's time to pull out the razor. I know for sure that experiences exist as experiences, because this truth is self-evident: I do, in fact have them. I cannot know for sure that objects exist as objects, because I interface with them only through experience.

Therefore, the BOP is on physicalism to demonstrate that something we can't see, properly imagine or define, exists as an actual thing and not just a property of mathematical or conceptual truths interacting through time.

Further, you are actually attacking a straw man. Sure, 19th century materialism, which is not the same as physicalism, has been hammered by science. However, the basics still remain: reality at it's most fundamental and durable level is composed of matter/energy/fields and their interactions, and spacetime which is definitely not an idealist-friendly position.

1. There's nothing about any of those things which is counter-idealist. All those things are interfaced through our experiences and our ideas about our experiences. Whether those experiences come from the Matrix, a BIJ, the Mind of God or a completely objective physical monist reality is not knowable to us.
2. We think of all those things as real objects. But you can't directly interact with any of those objects. At best, you are experiencing emergent properties, and equating those properties with the "real" objects you think underly them. That's idealism at work.

However, I'm going to pose a dilemma for you Benny by combining what Rasetsu said with what I said in the OP:

That's not really the OP, you thread hijacking diva!

You either have to be a solipsist or a theist if you're an idealist.

No, you don't, unless you want to say a really big mind or collections of minds must be called God.

To reiterate, idealism says that only things which are thought of exist. This entails that under an idealist metaphysic, there exists "omni-cogniscience", that is, everything is thought of. Thoughts are a mental substance. Hence, idealism necessarily entails the existence of a mental substance that is omni-cognizant. This basically is God, which atheists clearly don't believe in and can provide good reasons to doubt the existence of. The only way to avoid this seems to be solipsism, and say that there is only a single mental substance that is not omni-cognizant.

God is a single, organized mind that acts as an agent in arranging and interfering with other minds (or sub-minds). Arguing that any rules which relate ideas and experiences consistently should be called God is not that different than saying that all the rules of gravity and other forces, of fields, etc. should be called God. If you are looking for something to attach the name "God" to, those are fair enough candidates. But necessary? No, I don't think so.

Are you an idealistic-theist or a solipsist?

Are you a potato, or a potatist?