Contra Metaphysical Idealism

[bennyboy]

I'd still like to get your thoughts on split brain subjects, nonetheless.

That's a rather strong claim, not only that experiences haven't been reduced to brain matters, but that they will never be reduced to brain matters. Do you have an argument or evidence for your position?

Okay, I'd say two things about this. First, experiences ARE reducible down to brain matter; but the brain matter (like everything else we consider physical) may itself not be reducible down to anything but concepts.

Second, the hard problem of consciousness is more about psychogony than psychomorphology (if you'll permit me to coin a couple words here). Why would any arrangement of purely physical "stuff" allow/require the spawning of subjective experience at all? There have been answers, but they seem suspiciously vague and biased-- often a vague wave in the direction of evolution, often the insistence on operationalized definitions ("Consciousness is really just the ability to respond to the environment!").

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space is a thing in of itself right? That has been shown.

I'm not sure what meaning of "thing" you are using with this statement.

The idea of a thing takeing up space is because to have an "idea" you have to have some type of "interaction" between stuff.

If by "stuff," you are talking about objects made of physical matter, then I don't accept that assertion.

Is the animating force an "idea". it seems that is not the case. The split brain is meaning less because the brain is particle interactions. It is something.

I'm not sure that QM particles are, or are composed of, "things."