An Argument Against Supernatural Causation

[Caecilian]

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The first section of your post seems to me to point towards Kim's argument being valid- extra dimensions don't help for more or less the same reasons that spatializing the soul doesn't help.

Quite the contrary. It shows that Kim's argument is invalidated by string theory because in string theory there are other spatial dimensions that (in principle) can "carry" causal chains undetectable for us.

I disagree. As I said in one of my previous posts, it seems to me that this 'alternative causation' makes the 'supernatural' into a natural category (amenable to scientific study being the hallmark of the natural).

That's an interesting proposal, but it's faulty and a corruption of language because it redefines a term to prove a point in hindsight.

If you say that you exclude the supernatural than you leave open the possibility that there is a phenomenon X that might be considered part of "the supernatural". So X might be labeled as a supernatural concept. The supernatural here is defined as not being part of the natural. It is the negation of the natural. But the natural in short is that what is under (possible) investigation of science. That what we can know of, conforms to a pattern and somehow have access to.

But if Y is a phenomenon we knowingly or unknowingly never can have acccess to, than there is no distinction between the hypothesized natural version of Y and the supernatural version of Y. As is the current situation for string theory since it isn't evidenced.

Please observe that your definition of the natural (amenable to scientific study) does not suffice to settle the dispute since this without further criterions in the end is an argument from authorithy (it ultimately relies on the authority with some party to label it scientific). Is mathematics scientific study? It cannot be evidenced from reality but it sure as hell is amenable to scientific study.

So, I wonder, according to you is string theory supernatural now and maybe natural tomorrow?

If so, than to say so is a redefinition of terms and comparing the old definition with the new one a logical impossibility.

You could use other definitions of naturalism, for instance
1) Equate it to monism, the idea that there is one type of stuff. Than if we ever find evidence for some other stuff (dualism), the supernatural will be evidenced.
2) That's what logically consistent and coherent with natural phenomna we already know

But these definitions put restrictions on the natural that to my taste go beyond the intended meaning.

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Its apparent that what we lack here is an agreed definition of what counts as natural/ material and what counts as supernatural/ immaterial. The 2 definitions that you give are both problematic:

1) Relies on already having a definition of what would constitute a different sort of 'stuff'. But thats exactly what we don't have.
2) Similar situation- we don't have a definition of 'natural phenomena'. It also admits the possibility of something that is supernatural now becoming natural tomorrow, when we discover an indubitably natural phenomenon that is consistent with it.

I'm not sure if necessary and sufficient conditions is the way to go here. Perhaps 'supernatural' is more like a Wittgenstinian 'game'.