Existential Import
April 4, 2015 at 12:26 am
(This post was last modified: April 4, 2015 at 12:41 am by Mudhammam.)
I've been kind of bothered by something tonight. Well, a few things. First, when philosophers talk about "existential import," it seems like they mean it primarily in the sense of whether something has a "material" existence or not. But how does that apply to what we may call "formal existence," such as abstract objects: numbers and/or logical relationships? Or "fictional" existence, such as mythological creatures? And what about moral concepts? How would you classify their existence and if it even makes sense to ask, would you say they have existential import or not? Or are they necessarily excluded by being universal statements? Or can they only be properly used in reference to particular events?
And how can we justify giving precedent to perceptive existence versus conceptual existence?
Finally, when we speak of substances and properties, such as "the ball" and "redness," respectively, for example, do each exist in the same way?
It seems like even the word existence, apart from the actual nature of material objects and/or thoughts in time x and place y perishing and becoming one moment to the next, is ambiguous. It's stressing me out. I feel like.... I'm vaporizing....
Just kidding.
Thoughts?
And how can we justify giving precedent to perceptive existence versus conceptual existence?
Finally, when we speak of substances and properties, such as "the ball" and "redness," respectively, for example, do each exist in the same way?
It seems like even the word existence, apart from the actual nature of material objects and/or thoughts in time x and place y perishing and becoming one moment to the next, is ambiguous. It's stressing me out. I feel like.... I'm vaporizing....
Just kidding.
Thoughts?
He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return - Baruch Spinoza
