@Benny
Would we expect any function that approaches consciousness to be present at the particle level? I would think that beyond molecules we'd just be dealing with physics. But at the molecular level of say, neuron cells, we should expect there to be gradations of sensation (though I wonder if single-celled organisms have anything like a modicum of sensation or if they operate as more sophisticated machinations in the same way as inanimate objects do when forces are at play), and given increases in the complexity of arrangement and hence function, processes that unveil greater or lesser degrees of consciousness. By processes I mean input of data that outputs representations of vision, sounds, smells, etc., which is still more or less sensation, but in a system that involves an element of (abstract) differentiation between the system itself and external forces in the environment. This abstract element too should be reducible to computations in the sense that the phenomena of self, consciousness, mind, etc. appears dependent on biological processes at work. That said, the abstractions themselves may not be reducible in the same way that "principles of nature" are not reducible to nature itself, i.e. as strictly material objects (absent of principles that contain certain relationships such as cause and effect or logical necessity). So then, are abstract principles of mind in the same class of objects as principles of nature, e.g. the mathematical language used to construct an intelligible framework of gravitational force, the nuclear forces, the rules of biological development, etc.?
Would we expect any function that approaches consciousness to be present at the particle level? I would think that beyond molecules we'd just be dealing with physics. But at the molecular level of say, neuron cells, we should expect there to be gradations of sensation (though I wonder if single-celled organisms have anything like a modicum of sensation or if they operate as more sophisticated machinations in the same way as inanimate objects do when forces are at play), and given increases in the complexity of arrangement and hence function, processes that unveil greater or lesser degrees of consciousness. By processes I mean input of data that outputs representations of vision, sounds, smells, etc., which is still more or less sensation, but in a system that involves an element of (abstract) differentiation between the system itself and external forces in the environment. This abstract element too should be reducible to computations in the sense that the phenomena of self, consciousness, mind, etc. appears dependent on biological processes at work. That said, the abstractions themselves may not be reducible in the same way that "principles of nature" are not reducible to nature itself, i.e. as strictly material objects (absent of principles that contain certain relationships such as cause and effect or logical necessity). So then, are abstract principles of mind in the same class of objects as principles of nature, e.g. the mathematical language used to construct an intelligible framework of gravitational force, the nuclear forces, the rules of biological development, etc.?
He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return - Baruch Spinoza
