We are no different than computers

[Mudhammam]

So, if we were able to reduce HUMAN minds, this combination of intellect and sensation, i.e. our personal experiences, to something like a vast network of computations and signals, does that force us to view our experiences---and by extension, of the entire world---as a sort of computer simulation?

I don't know what you mean by this.  Comp mind says that consciousness and experience is a form of computation.  Just what that form takes is currently unknown.  

I guess what I mean is one of two aspects of the mind-body problem: 1) Imagine what the world might appear like to an AI that possesses experience (or for that matter, a bat). It would undoubtedly be quite different than what we experience as "the external world." If mind is but a physical arrangement of molecules (those also being concepts that we derive from mind), does our experience of a self that perceives distinct objects, colors, sounds, etc., and conceives of thoughts, unity, order, etc., imply that those "outside" things are also computations which exist as they appear to us only in the hardware of "like-minded" biological designs? Or do those qualities take on the characters that they do because of attributes that are exclusive to their own natures and which exist independently from a creature's internal "simulation" of them, though in a manner that mental hardware can never apprehend apart from definitions (as opposed to direct or indirect experience)? I mean something like Kant's "thing-in-itself." Or 2) as the mind is a form of computation that develops its own computational systems (such as AI), is nature also a programmer in the sense that we are? Is nature at large also a form of computation? Where is the dividing line between the machine (us) and its artificer (the environment)? Does comp theory deal with that? Or is everything part of one Great Machine as Descartes proposed, and we stand as something like highly specialized programs within a "universe's hard drive"?